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  INTRODUCTION   
In June 2017, Spain’s Banco Popular, the country’s fifth 
largest bank, failed in an orderly fashion—vindicating, it 
seemed, the rules put in place to manage such insolvencies fol-
lowing the 2008 Financial Crisis.1 Weighed down by a $100 bil-
lion portfolio of bad loans—including toxic mortgages doled out 
 
 1. See Martin Arnold et al., Why Santander Rescue of Banco Popular Is a 
European Test Case, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
4fe8680a-4b53-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43 (discussing the Single Resolution 
Board—a mechanism put in place in Europe to deal with failing banks); 
Gretchen Morgenson, Lessons from the Collapse of Banco Popular, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/business/lessons-from 
-the-collapse-of-banco-popular.html; see also Matt Levine, Bank Bailouts and 
Property Taxes, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/ 
articles/2017-06-07/bank-bailouts-and-property-taxes (noting the neat and by-
the-book wind down of Banco Popular). It should be noted that the Banco Pop-
ular wind down remains the exemplar model of a successful wind down in Eu-
rope. In late 2016, Deutsche Bank, too, looked like it might be in danger follow-
ing an adverse judgment by the U.S. Department of Justice regarding 
fraudulent activities relating to misselling mortgage-backed securities in the 
run-up to the Crisis. Landon Thomas, Jr., Concern over Deutsche Bank’s Health 
Shakes Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
09/30/business/dealbook/concern-over-deutsche-banks-health-shakes-markets 
.html; see Martin Wolf, Deutsche Bank Offers a Tough Lesson in Risk, FIN. 
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/56be629e-896e-11e6-8aa5 
-f79f5696c731. But see Thomas Hale, Why Bank Capital Has a Problem, FIN. 
TIMES: FT ALPHAVILLE (July 12, 2017, 12:35 AM), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/ 
2017/07/12/2191295/why-bank-capital-has-a-problem (noting the problems with 
securities designed to convert to equity close to bank failure, for example, in 
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prior to the 2008 Crisis—Banco Popular was sold off to a com-
petitor for the token sum of one euro and handily wound up with-
out much of an effect on the market.2 It had lost the confidence 
of its depositors, who were rushing to withdraw their savings, as 
well as that of the market, where its share price was plunging.3 
With these rapidly deteriorating prospects, authorities triggered 
regulatory processes that could take the failing bank and wind 
it up, preventing the sort of chaos seen in the aftermath of the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.4 Importantly, the losses fell on 
those who should bear them. Banco’s shareholders and those 
holding securities designed to convert to equity in a bank col-
lapse, absorbed the cost.5 With its equity worth just one euro at 
its wind down, post-Crisis rules seemed to work exactly as 
planned, ensuring that a major bank’s shareholders bore the 
costs of its bad behavior and prevented risks from spreading to 
other firms in the financial system.6 
But Spain’s banks were not the only ones struggling in the 
summer of 2017. Italy’s banking crisis that year culminated in 
the near collapse of the world’s oldest bank and Italy’s fourth 
largest lender, Monte dei Paschi di Siena.7 As with Banco Popu-
lar, authorities looked to Monte’s shareholders, and those whose 
 
accelerating collapse). 
 2. Chad Bray & Jack Ewing, Santander Rescues Troubled Rival in Test of 
Europe’s New Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
06/07/business/dealbook/santander-banco-popular-takeover.html; Levine, su-
pra note 1; Morgenson, supra note 1. 
 3. Bray & Ewing, supra note 2; Morgenson, supra note 1. 
 4. See, e.g., Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman’s Chaotic Bankruptcy Filing De-
stroyed Billions in Value, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB123050916770038267. See generally MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY 
PROBLEM (2016) (arguing that panics constitute a root cause of financial crises, 
including the 2008 Financial Crisis where panic ensued in the bank-like money 
market for financial institutions); HAL S. SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTA-
GION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS (2016) (discussing the 
contagion which followed the Lehman bankruptcy). 
 5. Offering Circular, Banco Popular Español, S.A., €750,000,000 Addi-
tional Tier 1 High Trigger Contingent Convertible Perpetual Preferred Securi-
ties (Feb. 5, 2015) (on file with Minnesota Law Review). 
 6. The wind down of Banco Popular was carried out under the administra-
tion of the European Single Resolution Board and the Single Resolution Fund, 
designed to offer a pan-European mechanism for winding down failing banks. 
See About SRB, SINGLE RESOL. BOARD, https://srb.europa.eu/en/mission (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2018). It forms part of the pan-European bank supervisory sys-
tem under the auspices of the European Central Bank. Id. 
 7. See EU Clears Italy’s $6 Billion State Bailout for Monte dei Paschi, REU-
TERS (July 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-montepaschi 
-stateaid/eu-clears-italys-6-billion-state-bailout-for-monte-dei-paschi 
-idUSKBN19P1PQ [hereinafter REUTERS]. 
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bond interests would convert to equity, to bear the brunt of the 
collapse. On this occasion, however, around half of those holding 
the convertible junior bonds were everyday mom-and-pop retail 
investors.8 Rather than allow losses to fall on this more vulner-
able group, the Italian state set aside 1.5 billion euros in tax-
payer funds to buy up their claims and to insulate them from the 
worst of the losses.9 
These contrasting approaches to large bank failures illus-
trate the gap between the aspirations of post-Crisis rules—de-
signed to make shareholders absorb the impact of risk-taking—
and the muddier reality of implementation. In response to the 
2008 Crisis, regulation requires banks to shore up their balance 
sheets by maintaining a much thicker “rainy day fund,” com-
prised more fully than in years past of capital raised from equity 
investors.10 Buffered by a deeper reserve of equity, banks can 
operate more safely in good times, as well as access funds to pay 
off depositors, short-term creditors, and senior creditors in case 
of failure.11 
 
 8. Giovanni Legorano & Julia-Ambra Verlaine, Italy Eyes Exemption to 
Spare Monte Paschi Bond Holders, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www 
.wsj.com/articles/italy-eyes-exemption-to-spare-monte-paschi-bond-holders 
-1482516483. 
 9. See REUTERS, supra note 7; Rachel Sanderson et al., Italy Sets Aside 
€17bn to Wind Down Failing Lenders, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2017), https://www 
.ft.com/content/83ad52a8-59a5-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b. 
 10. See generally Peter Miu et al., Can Basel III Work? Examining the New 
Capital Stability Rules by the Basel Committee: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Study of Capital Buffers 6–9 (Feb. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (providing the historical background to the development of Basel III). 
Contingent capital—where bonds turn to equity as a bank heads into crisis—
represent one kind of security being used to buffer bank reserves in some juris-
dictions. See Peter Went, Basel III Accord: Where Do We Go from Here? (Oct. 
15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (providing an early 
explication of the rationale grounding the Basel III international reforms); Erik 
Lüders et al., Hidden in Plain Sight: The Hunt for Banking Capital, MCKINSEY 
& COMPANY (Jan. 2010), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial 
-services/our-insights/hidden-in-plain-sight-the-hunt-for-banking-capital. 
 11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, §§ 202(a), 206, 124 Stat. 1444, 1459 (2010) (stating shareholders 
are the last to be paid out and are thus wiped out); see David A. Skeel, Jr., Single 
Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE 
311–33 (Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014). It should be noted that 
commentators have remarked on various drawbacks of Dodd-Frank’s Orderly 
Liquidation Authority (OLA). See THOMAS H. JACKSON ET AL., RESOLUTION OF 
FAILED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND A 
NEW CHAPTER 14 (2011) (proposing that a new Chapter 14 of the Bankruptcy 
Code be drawn up to offer an alternative to the involuntary OLA process). These 
authors also discuss management responses to the incentives set up by the OLA. 
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In formulating and implementing these rules, however, pol-
icymakers have neglected to examine the question of which ac-
tors, in fact, constitute the major equity holders of large banks.12 
Scant regulatory attention has been paid to identifying those 
who take on the residual default risk of a large bank’s failure 
and thus rank last in line to be paid back in the event the bank 
heads towards collapse. This inquiry is significant for two rea-
sons. First, knowing which actors are taking on exposure to bank 
equity offers insight into how effectively they might manage this 
risk. As with any other company, shareholders possess an array 
of corporate governance tools to safeguard their exposure by ag-
itating for outcomes regarding how managers run the business. 
Major bank shareholders, with significant downside exposure, 
should be well motivated to exercise these tools. Still, if particu-
lar bank shareholders are ineffective or unwilling to engage in 
 
Id. at 1–6. See Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mech-
anism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions (Colum-
bia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 362, 2009), for an early discussion of ap-
proaches to resolving large, failing firms and the Bankruptcy Code. On using 
bankruptcy rules to facilitate the use of single point of entry under the OLA, see 
Symposium, Implementing Symmetric Treatment of Financial Contracts in 
Bankruptcy and Bank Resolution, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 155 (2015). 
This article also examines the operation of the exemptions from the automatic 
stay for derivatives trades. Id. See also JOHN F. BOVENZI ET AL., TOO BIG TO 
FAIL: THE PATH TO A SOLUTION (2013), for a discussion of ex-post solutions to 
the too-big-to-fail problem. 
 12. It should be noted that the Trump administration is pursuing a revision 
of the reforms undertaken in the wake of the Financial Crisis, including revi-
sions to the OLA, set up to provide for the orderly wind down of large and com-
plex financial institutions. See Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump 
Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress 
-financial-regulations.html. However, even with attempts to dilute or remove 
the OLA, proposals offered suggest using the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to wind 
down complex institutions. See Financial Choice Act, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. 
(2017); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECO-
NOMIC OPPORTUNITIES (2017). Even within a more usual bankruptcy process, 
shareholders are the last to be paid out and are expected to provide the value 
needed to pay off creditors higher on the priority ladder. This is reflected in the 
Absolute Priority Rule in bankruptcy, where shareholders only get paid when 
all other creditor claims are satisfied. There is enormous literature on the Ab-
solute Priority Rule with discussions and criticisms of its approach. See gener-
ally Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Un-
certainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930 (2006) 
(examining the viability of the Absolute Priority Rule and the conditions 
prompting deviations from the Rule); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921 (2001) (noting the drawbacks of a strict ad-
herence to absolute priority and proposing “relative priority”). See also sources 
and discussion infra note 40. 
  
592 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:587 
 
bank governance, potentially increasing the likelihood that 
banks are run riskily, regulators can fill in gaps in oversight and 
pick up the slack. 
Second, understanding who really holds the risk of bank 
failure can help regulators determine whether these sharehold-
ers possess the institutional resilience to absorb the likely losses. 
Exemplified by the approach taken by Italian authorities to-
wards Monte dei Paschi’s retail investors, regulators may decide 
that certain investors should not bear these losses as a matter of 
political economy or financial stability.13 In such cases, regula-
tors face the prospect of needing to deploy taxpayer funds to 
bailout bank shareholders, or otherwise to force losses to be 
borne by another market actor better able to withstand the im-
pact. 
This Article fills this gap by identifying the major sharehold-
ers of the largest U.S. banks and exploring their effectiveness in 
overseeing these financial conglomerates. It makes three contri-
butions. 
First, this Article identifies major bank shareholders that, 
as a result of taking on increasing block equity positions since 
2011, have come to assume sizable residual default risk on the 
largest banks in the U.S. financial system. In the years following 
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, equity ownership of the 
twenty-six largest and most systemic U.S. banks has come to be 
focused in the hands of five major shareholders.14 Surveying 
 
 13. See, for example, Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Develop-
ing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951 (1992), for a discussion of bailout 
mechanisms versus the use of the bankruptcy regime. See also Kenneth Ayotte 
& David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts? 35 J. CORP. L. 469 (2010) (com-
paring the advantages of the traditional bankruptcy regime as an alternative to 
bailouts); Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Govern-
ment’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 470–75 (2009) 
(analyzing the response of the U.S. government to the financial crisis and the 
different techniques utilized by authorities to recapitalize failing institutions); 
Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011) (discussing 
whether bailouts should be done through Congress or an agency and creditors 
should be forced to accept partial payments as part of the bailout). 
 14. In order to determine which banks are the largest and/or most systemic, 
I examine the list of the U.S. headquartered and regulated banks that were 
subject to the Federal Reserve’s mandatory stress tests in 2017. The Federal 
Reserve stress tests subject banks to simulated doomsday scenarios to deter-
mine whether they are able to withstand critical shocks. See BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 
2016: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS (2016). The Federal Reserve fo-
cuses on stress testing the most systemically significant banking firms in the 
United States. Id. Out of the thirty-four banks that the Federal Reserve stress 
tested in 2017 as part of the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 
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their 2011 and 2017 annual proxy statements, BlackRock, Fidel-
ity, State Street Global Advisors, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard, 
have, during this period, each emerged as holders of multiple 
block equity ownership stakes (stakes of 5% or more of the bank’s 
common equity) within the banking system.15 Whereas these 
large banks had zero or just a single equity blockholder listed on 
their 2011 proxy statements, their 2017 filings showed a marked 
shift towards at least one if not multiple blockholders at each 
 
(CCAR) program, I do not look at banks whose main base of operations and 
primary regulators are outside of the United States. On this basis, out of the 
thirty-four companies subject to Federal Reserve stress tests, I do not look at 
BancWest Corporation, BBVA Compass Bancshares, BMO Financial Corp., 
Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation, HSBC North America Holdings, MUFG 
Americas Holdings, and Santander Holdings USA.I also do not look at TD U.S. 
Holdings LLC as this company is not publicly traded. On proposed reforms to 
the stress tests regime, see sources and discussion infra note 40. 
 15. As Professors Edmans and Holderness note, the definition of what con-
stitutes a blockholder can vary. Alex Edmans & Clifford G. Holderness, Block-
holders: Theory and Evidence, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE 541 (2017) (discussing blockholding). The 5% threshold—
i.e., owning 5% or more of an entity’s stock, such that the holder owns a 5% 
“block”—is generally useful as it is used by the SEC for reporting purposes, re-
quiring those that achieve this level of ownership to mandatorily report their 
holdings. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Eco-
nomics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012) (discussing the 
disclosure regime and its impact on investor incentives to acquire large hold-
ings). 
  It should be noted that out of the twenty-six banks that I reviewed sub-
ject to the 2017 stress tests, Citizens Financial Group was not included as part 
of the survey on 2011 ownership as it was then a United Kingdom based bank 
that was a wholly owned subsidiary of the United Kingdom’s Royal Bank of 
Scotland. Elizabeth Dexheimer, RBS Raises $2.6 Billion Selling Citizens Finan-
cial Shares, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-10-29/citizens-says-rbs-is-selling-its-remaining-2-7-billion-stake. 
Also excluded from the 2011 survey is CIT Group, which filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection in 2009 and only reemerged as a bank in late 2011. To-
moeh Murakami Tse, Lender CIT Group Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Pro-
tection, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2009/11/01/AR2009110101470.html. As such, the 2011 survey 
looks at twenty-four out of the twenty-six banks on the Federal Reserve’s list. 
See id.; see also Edmans & Holderness, supra; Halah Touryalai, Back from 
Bankruptcy: CIT and John Thain’s Stunning Turnaround, FORBES (Aug. 9, 
2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/08/09/back-from 
-bankruptcy-cit-and-john-thains-stunning-turnaround/#58d2a860152b (dis-
cussing CIT’s return from its 2009 bankruptcy). It should also be noted that 
Zions Bank has successfully applied to shed its designation as a systematically 
important bank. See John Heltman, FSOC Removes Zions’ Systemic Risk Label, 
AM. BANKER (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/fsoc 
-removes-zions-systemic-risk-label. As such, Zion Bank will be subject to fewer 
future regulatory investigations (such as likely not being subject to future an-
nual stress tests) to determine its risk to the financial system. See id.  
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bank.16 Moreover, with the exception of Fidelity, all of these 
shareholders increased the number of block positions held be-
tween the period of 2011–2017.17 Whereas Vanguard was a 
blockholder at just one of the surveyed banks in 2010/11, it had 
assumed twenty-five positions by 2016/17. Blackrock, a block-
holder at ten banks in 2010/11, also ranked as a blockholder at 
twenty-five firms by 2016/17. State Street, which had one major 
block stake in 2010/11 had accumulated twelve by 2016/17. 
To be sure, it should not be surprising that BlackRock, Fi-
delity, State Street, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard, hold signifi-
cant equity stakes across publicly traded bank holding compa-
nies.18 For one, these investors constitute some of the most 
prolific shareholders in capital markets, with positions held 
throughout the population of publicly traded firms. As fund (or 
asset) managers, directing the pooled wealth of corporate and 
retail savers into investments, they easily represent the most 
abundant sources of capital for public companies.19 BlackRock, 
for example, boasted nearly $6.3 trillion in assets under man-
agement in 2017, Vanguard boasted around $5 trillion as of Jan-
uary 2018, and Fidelity boasted around $2.5 trillion as of March 
2018.20 Positioned to represent this wealth as shareholders of 
record for the mutual and other funds organized within their or-
ganization, BlackRock, Vanguard, and others constitute a pow-
erful and pervasive presence across both Main Street and Wall 
Street.21 
 
 16. See tables and discussion infra Part II.B. 
 17. See tables and discussion infra Part II.B. Fidelity Investments is listed 
as FMR LLC. 
 18. See The Monolith and the Markets, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2013, at 25–28; 
The Rise of Blackrock, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2013, at 13. 
 19. Asset managers like BlackRock, Fidelity, or Vanguard hold capital 
within any number of specialized funds organized under the larger umbrella of 
the “fund brand.” See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A 
Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 
(2014), for a discussion of the implications of separation between the economic 
ownership and management structure of funds. See also John Morley & Quinn 
Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t 
Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 87, 92–94 (2010) (noting that the mu-
tual fund industry as a whole held assets of around $11 trillion and comprised 
20% of U.S. financial assets and retirement savings). 
 20. BLACKROCK, FIDUCIARY FOR YOU (2017); Fast Facts About Vanguard, 
VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/fast-facts (last visited Oct. 
22, 2018); Fidelity by the Numbers: Corporate Statistics, FIDELITY, https:// 
www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/fidelity-by-numbers/corporate-statistics (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2018); see The Monolith and the Markets, supra note 18; The 
Rise of Blackrock, supra note 18. 
 21. See Morley, supra note 19, at 1230–40. 
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That banks should wish to court this source of funding is 
understandable, especially when seeking to grow their equity 
base following the Crisis. But asset managers, too, possess 
strong incentives to invest in the equity of U.S. banks. Following 
the Crisis, banks have enjoyed a return to profitability, holding 
out the promise of dividends and rising share prices.22 Further, 
for asset managers tasked with investing in a diversified set of 
companies, putting capital into bank equity reflects a balanced 
portfolio, especially at a time of rising bank prospects. 
But banks are not ordinary public companies. In its second 
contribution, this Article assesses the effectiveness of asset man-
agers—firms that specialize in investing cash and other assets 
on behalf of others—in overseeing bank risk through the levers 
of corporate governance. In taking on blockholder positions 
across multiple banks, BlackRock, Vanguard, and others admin-
ister funds that stand to suffer potentially significant losses in 
the event of a large bank failure. From the standpoint of post-
Crisis policy, funds invested in bank equity should expect to see 
the value of these positions reduced to zero in order to help pay 
off creditors and depositors. 
In this context, bank shareholders confront a uniquely com-
plex set of costs in overseeing the largest U.S. banks.23 For a 
start, banks are structurally risky. Owing money in the short-
term (in the form of deposits) and holding assets in the long-term 
 
 22. See Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Comm’n, Chair-
man’s Opening Statement Third Quarter 2016 Quarterly Banking Profile (Nov. 
29, 2016), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spnov2916.html; Jon Ma-
rino, Big Banks Dial Up Buybacks After Stress-Testing Win, CNBC (June 29, 
2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/29/big-banks-dial-up-buybacks-after 
-stress-testing-win.html. In the last quarter of 2016, for example, Goldman 
Sachs reported profits of around $2.2 billion—up from $574 million the year 
before and reflective of a generally positive performance trend across other large 
banks. See Evelyn Cheng, Citi Doubles Dividend, Bank Shares Jump After In-
dustry Passes Fed Stress Tests, CNBC (June 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2017/06/28/citi-doubles-dividend-bank-shares-jump-after-industry-passes-fed 
-stress-tests.html; Olivia Oran & Richa Naidu, Goldman Sachs Profit Soars on 
Bond-Trading Surge, REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-goldman-sachs-results-idUSKBN1521OT. 
 23. See, e.g., John Armour & Jeffrey Gordon, Systemic Harms and Share-
holder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35 (2014) (observing that the notion of share-
holder primacy is much weaker in banking given that adhering to this notion 
can result in undue risk-taking by bank managers). See generally Christopher 
M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in Post-Crisis Financial Firms: Two 
Fundamental Tensions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (observing the sig-
nificance of corporate governance as a key factor governing financial system risk 
and highlighting lack of focus by regulators on governance in post-Crisis regu-
lation). 
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(in the form of loans), their workings are marked by a maturity 
mismatch that gives rise to the persistent threat of a bank run.24 
The danger that depositors might rush at once to extract their 
money, draining banks of cash and triggering fire sales of their 
assets, introduces systematic instability to bank design and a 
ready-made challenge for bank governance. In an interconnected 
financial system, a crisis at one bank can spread to others if de-
positors scramble to retrieve their money from multiple banks 
and asset sales depress the value of bank balance sheets across 
the board.25 
The task of overseeing large and complex banks is further 
complicated by the challenge of interpreting their informational 
opacity.26 Bank assets, in the form of loans, are often difficult 
and time-consuming to value. The larger banks—with their cor-
respondingly greater number of assets—can place a particularly 
heavy burden on asset managers seeking to understand the de-
fault risk assumed by their funds.27 For those firms whose funds 
are invested in the equity of multiple large banks, these costs 
will mount and potentially disincentivize investigation and over-
sight. 
Worse still, theory observes that bank shareholders tend 
also to be uniquely opportunistic and risk seeking. Asset manag-
ers, maintaining blockholder positions across several big banks, 
may (at least according to theory) be especially vulnerable to the 
pull of this opportunism. Banks benefit from an explicit public 
subsidy to support their economic functions.28 The state guaran-
tees the value of deposits and banks enjoy access to emergency 
funds from the Federal Reserve.29 Furthermore, as made clear 
in 2008, banks can also be given a taxpayer bailout to cauterize 
a systemic and economic fallout. In light of this state support, 
theory recognizes that banks generally enjoy lower funding costs 
relative to other types of businesses.30 The availability of this 
 
 24. See discussion infra Part I.A.1–2. 
 25. See discussion infra Part I.A.1–2. 
 26. Armour & Gordon, supra note 23; Bruner, supra note 23. See Lev Me-
nand, Article, Too Big to Supervise: The Rise of Financial Conglomerates and 
the Decline of Discretionary Oversight in Banking, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2018), for a discussion on the challenges of supervising large banks and the 
rise of private, compliance-based risk management in bank regulation to con-
tend with the challenge. 
 27. See discussion infra Part I.A.1–2. 
 28. See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
 29. See discussion infra Part 1.A.1–2. 
 30. See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
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safety net can motivate bank shareholders to behave in ways 
that are aggressively risk chasing. Shareholders are driven to 
push managers towards taking bigger risks promising profits 
and generous dividends.31 The risky downside is cushioned by 
the protection offered by the public safety net. Because of explicit 
and implicit public assistance, shareholders can underprice risk-
taking by banks (relative to how they may price risk at other 
firms), encouraging them to use governance to push for reckless, 
rather than risk-mitigating, outcomes.32 Where shareholders are 
blockholders at the largest U.S. banks—firms most likely to be 
offered more open-ended state support in case of crisis—their in-
centives to subvert governance in favor of risk-taking may be es-
pecially strong. 
But this Article offers a different account. It posits that asset 
managers can, in fact, prove a positive in assuring safety and 
soundness in financial markets regulation. Asset managers like 
BlackRock or Vanguard are likely to be less incentivized to fol-
low the risk-seeking behaviors of the paradigmatically aggres-
sive bank shareholder. Unlike institutions with their own money 
on the line and whose managers are paid in accordance with the 
profits they generate for investors, traditional asset managers 
follow a different model. They manage other people’s wealth, not 
their own, and reward managers less through performance-
based fees and more through fixed compensation.33 In seeking to 
attract everyday retail customers, their services are often mar-
keted as low-cost, constraining the resources available for 
mounting expensive, activist campaigns.34 Unsurprisingly, as 
Professors Gilson and Gordon write, asset managers like 
BlackRock, Fidelity, or Vanguard, have long been viewed as pas-
sive players in corporate governance.35 
This passive posture towards Main Street governance, 
though widely criticized, can be beneficial for Wall Street firms. 
 
 31. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 32. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 33. See Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b) (2006) (plac-
ing restrictions on the ability of mutual funds to charge their beneficiaries in-
centive-orientated fees for managers). Rather, funds are rewarded as their over-
all base of clients grows through the influx of money from savers. Id. 
 34. See The Benefits of Lower Costs, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard 
.com/what-sets-vanguard-apart/the-benefits-of-lower-costs (last visited Oct. 22, 
2018). 
 35. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Cap-
italism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 866–74 (2013). 
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Asset managers, as blockholders across multiple financial insti-
tutions, should lack the requisite incentives to use their power-
ful, systemic foothold in bank governance for risk chasing at the 
taxpayers’ expense. 
But simply remaining passive is not assurance of good bank 
oversight. Indeed, if major shareholders leave too much slack, 
managers can take risks that eventually place bank equity in 
peril of being used up or devalued to meet the costs of a crisis. 
In concluding, this Article’s third contribution lies in propos-
ing pathways to harness the position and incentives of asset 
managers to create a private, system-wide source of shareholder 
monitoring of financial markets. In particular, it explores the 
possibility of tasking top asset managers, holding sizable equity 
positions, with more active supervision of the banks in which 
they are invested. From the post-Crisis regulatory standpoint, 
BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard, 
can ill-afford to experience a bad banking crisis. With their funds 
contributing extensively to the bank equity of the largest finan-
cial institutions, the economic costs of a systemic fallout are 
likely to be especially punishing. 
Asset managers have unique advantages in performing 
oversight. As the biggest shareholders in the marketplace, they 
are well placed to absorb the high cost of monitoring banks and 
to use this research to develop systemic insights on account of 
their repeat blockholdings. With blockholder stakes, their inter-
ventions should also carry considerable weight with bank man-
agement. Most importantly, asset managers, owing fiduciary du-
ties to fund holders invested across multiple banks, can more 
fully advocate for the broader interest of safeguarding the finan-
cial system.36 Indeed, there are some signs that major asset man-
agers may be willing to take on the costs of more active corporate 
 
 36. This proposal may be seen as especially problematic from an antitrust 
point of view. There is a growing literature around the concept of common own-
ership of Main Street public companies by the major asset managers. See gen-
erally JOSÉ AZAR, SAHIL RAINA & MARTIN SCHMALZ, ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP AND 
BANK OWNERSHIP 46, tbl.I (2016) [hereinafter AZAR, ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP] 
(showing the top five shareholders in the six largest American banks in the sec-
ond quarter of 2013 and the first quarter of 2002); José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz 
& Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 
(2018) [hereinafter Azar, Anticompetitive Effects] (noting the influence of these 
investors in potentially incentivizing anticompetitive effects in airline compa-
nies); Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016) 
(providing an antitrust critique of common ownership, focusing on the airline 
industry); Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to 
Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 
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governance. In January 2018, for example, with respect to their 
enormous portfolio of investments, Larry Fink—BlackRock’s 
CEO—highlighted the firm’s goal of using its position to push for 
more long-term “investment stewardship” of the public compa-
nies where it invests.37 
Importantly, a dialogue between regulators and major bank 
shareholders can promote a more concrete understanding of who 
ultimately bears the risk of large bank failures.38 To the extent 
that this allocation of default risk holds out undesirable policy 
consequences, as in the case of Monte dei Paschi, regulation is 
better equipped to respond ex ante, rather than have to manage 
the messy fallout ex post. As the specter of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis gradually recedes in time, fueling efforts to deregulate the 
banking sector, oversight by bank shareholders grows in signifi-
cance.39 By offering continuing private supervision for banks 
through changing economic life cycles—as well as being a source 
 
669 (2017) (proposing the challenges of market concentration can be addressed 
by requiring investors in an oligopolistic industry to choose between limiting 
their holdings of an industry to a small stake or to hold the shares of a single 
“effective firm”). Commentators have also critiqued this argument. See Edward 
B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional 
Investor Involvement in Corporate Governance (NYU Law & Econ. Research Pa-
per Series, Working Paper No. 17-05, 2017) (proposing a safe harbor to prevent 
anticompetitive effects and encourage institutional investors’ involvement in 
corporate governance); Matt Levine, Index-Fund Bans and Hedge-Fund Data, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11 
-22/index-fund-bans-and-hedge-fund-data (arguing that limiting investors to 
small stakes or a single effective firm is not plausible because it will cost too 
much). 
 37. Letter from Larry Fink, CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs (2018) (on file with 
Minnesota Law Review); see John C. Wilcox & Morrow Sodali, Getting Along 
with BlackRock, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 6, 
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/11/06/getting-along-with 
-blackrock (highlighting the proactive posture of BlackRock and BlackRock’s 
recognition of its fiduciary responsibility to exercise good governance). 
 38. Further recognizing the importance of corporate governance in bank 
risk management, the Federal Reserve has turned its attention to clarifying the 
role of bank boards. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Board 
Invites Public Comment on Two Proposals; Corporate Governance and Rating 
System for Large Financial Institutions (Aug. 3, 2017) (on file with author). The 
Federal Reserve’s proposal, for example, seeks to encourage boards to clearly 
outline strategic goals, risk management practices, and accountability 
measures and to use these as a basis for bank evaluation. 
 39. See Michelle Price & Pete Schroeder, Fed Unveils Rewrite of ‘Volcker 
Rule’ Limits on Bank Trading, REUTERS (May 29, 2018), https://www.reuters 
.com/article/us-usa-fed-volcker/fed-unveils-rewrite-of-volcker-rule-limits-on 
-bank-trading-idUSKCN1IV09Y. 
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of insight for public regulators—bank equity holders can be 
strong stewards of banks’ risk management practices.40  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the central-
ity of equity to the post-Crisis regulatory framework as the crit-
ical buffer to safeguard financial markets. Part II explores the 
role of asset managers in banking and surveys the block owner-
ship at the largest U.S. banks for the years 2011 and 2017. It 
shows that these banks now include a small number of asset 
managers as repeat equity blockholders in U.S. banking. Part III 
builds on this survey to explore the effectiveness of asset man-
agers in bank risk management and governance. Part IV offers 
a blueprint to more fully co-opt asset managers into bank super-
vision. Part V concludes. 
 
 40. It is important to note that Congressional and administrative efforts 
are underway to modify and tailor the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act. See 
DAVISPOLK, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY REFORM (2018), https://www 
.davispolk.com/files/davis_polk_financial_services_regulatory_reform_tool.pdf. 
While these efforts do not seek to lower the focus on strong buffers of equity as 
an essential component of safety and soundness regulation, they propose to 
change how these rules apply to mid-size and smaller banks. See id. In particu-
lar, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
(EGRRCPA) increased the statutory threshold at which the most stringent bank 
capital and stress testing provisions for banks take effect. Economic Growth, 
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, § 401, 
132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). Whereas the Dodd-
Frank Act mandated that firms with total assets of more than $50 billion be 
subject to enhanced prudential oversight, the EGRRCPA increased this thresh-
old to $250 billion and gave the Federal Reserve the discretion to apply these 
standards to banks with between $100 billion and $250 billion in total assets. 
Id. At the time of this writing, the Federal Reserve has drafted proposed rule-
making that would “significantly” reduce the compliance burden on firms with 
total assets between $100 billion and $250 billion. Memorandum from Randal 
Quarles, Vice Chairman for Supervision, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 3 (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/files/board-memo 
-20181031.pdf. Under this rulemaking, firms with assets between $100 billion 
and $250 billion would no longer be subject to Dodd-Frank’s enhanced liquidity 
standards to maintain a reserve of highly liquid assets that could be sold off 
during a panic. Id. at 3, 10–11. They would also no longer be subject to require-
ments to undergo annual stress tests and to disclose the results of these tests to 
the public. Id. at 3, 11. Instead, stress tests for such firms would take place 
every two years. Id. at 11. This new proposed rulemaking does not seek to alter 
the application of enhanced prudential rules and stress testing for firms with 
more than $250 billion in total assets or smaller firms whose profile makes them 
riskier than their peers. See id. at 2–4. In addition to this draft proposed rule-
making, reform proposes to expand the range of activities that banks can un-
dertake, dismantling Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule that restricted the ability of 
banks to engage in proprietary trading, or trading in securities with their own 
capital. See generally DAVISPOLK, supra, at 43–44 (providing an overview of 
current Volcker Rule reform efforts). 
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I.  BANKS, CONTAGION, AND CAPITAL   
By design, banks are unique in their capacity to cause wide-
spread economic damage.41 But they are also essential to a well-
functioning economy. Traditionally seen, banks take surplus 
funds from those who have it (depositors) and loan this money 
out to those who can use it productively (borrowers). They thus 
occupy a special place in the economy as providers of a public 
good.42 But banks can also fail, causing deep economic harm. 
They might, for example, make too many bad loans, prompting 
depositors to extract their savings in panic. If depositors cannot 
distinguish one failing bank from another, they might withdraw 
their money from any number of banks. In draining liquidity 
from the banking system, a bank collapse severely disrupts the 
flow of capital from savers to borrowers.43 
The fact of banks being both risky and essential has given 
rise to an elaborate body of law designed to make them safer and 
less prone to crises. Central banks offer distressed banks access 
to emergency loans; depositors are discouraged from panicking 
by the promise that their money is protected by state guarantee; 
and regulation requires banks to make sure that they “pay” for 
 
 41. See, e.g., RICKS, supra note 4, at 79–80 (noting the tendency of account 
holders to redeem when it looks likely that others might do the same). 
 42. See generally STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI, MONEY, BANKING AND FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS 38–41 (2008) (noting that a salient feature of banking and finan-
cial intermediation lies in taking “surplus units” of capital and loaning it to 
those who have “deficit units” of need for this money); GERALD CORRIGAN, ARE 
BANKS SPECIAL? A REVISITATION (2000) (noting that banks are “special” be-
cause “they offer transaction accounts; . . . they are the backup source of liquid-
ity for all other institutions; and . . . they are the transmission belt for monetary 
policy”); Pauline Skypala, The Reality Gap in the Role of Banks, FIN. TIMES 
(June 8, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/e336ea7e-0d33-11e5-a83a 
-00144feabdc0 (describing the traditional model of banks as intermediaries be-
tween savers and borrowers, facilitating credit and money creation). However, 
this traditional conception of banking is highly simplified, and commentators 
have identified complexities in this model and described various models of bank-
ing. For example, see Zoltan Jakab & Michael Kumhof, Banks Are Not Interme-
diaries of Loanable Funds—and Why This Matters (Bank of Eng., Working Pa-
per No. 529, 2015). Additionally, commentators note that banks also “create 
deposits when they make loans . . . effectively expanding the money supply.” 
Skypala, supra. Professors Omarova and Hockett have also reframed the un-
derstanding of banks as intermediaries by focusing on banks as publicly fran-
chised to dispense the full faith and credit of the United States through the 
financial system. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Fran-
chise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1158 (2017). Also, see RICKS, supra note 4, at 
79–80, which notes the deposit-issuing function of banks, rather than just func-
tioning as deposit takers. 
 43. RICKS, supra note 4, at 79–85. 
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the loans they make by maintaining a reserve of funds—bank 
capital—that can offer a protective buffer against crises.44 This 
Part examines the risks that banks create and how bank capital 
mitigates them. It highlights the reliance that regulatory policy 
places on equity as the most desirable type of bank capital. This 
Part sets the foundation for examining the central inquiry in this 
Article: with equity so necessary for capital reserves post-Crisis, 
which investors supply this equity in practice? 
A. WHY BANK REGULATION NEEDS EQUITY 
The importance of banks for modern economies is matched 
by the risks they create for markets. Instability lies at the heart 
of banking. 
1. Basics of Bank Function 
Banks manage the flow of capital in the economy. They cre-
ate deposits for those that save money. In modern banking, this 
arrangement takes the form of an on-demand liability on the 
bank’s books. A depositor loans its funds to the bank (a liability 
for the bank) and the bank promises to make these funds imme-
diately available on demand whenever a depositor wants. 
Banks also make loans to those needing capital. By smooth-
ing out the capital needs of homes and businesses, banks can 
encourage a more efficient flow of money. Home buyers do not 
need to save until such time as they have all the cash they need 
to buy a property—they can take out a loan instead; businesses 
do not need to keep large amounts of cash to make payroll—so 
long as they can generate the cash flows needed in the future to 
pay off a loan. If a lender believes that its borrowers are suffi-
ciently creditworthy to make payments on loans over a period of 
time, banks can bridge funding needs and encourage a produc-
tive use of capital.45 
 
 44. For a summary of the regulatory subsidies accorded to banks, see Pra-
sad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2014), 
which details the distortive impact of deposit insurance and lender-of-last-re-
sort funding on the cost of debt funding for banks. 
 45. Some scholars posit that the fragile capital structure underlying banks 
is necessary for them to perform their social function of mediating liquidity 
needs cheaply because if investors (depositors) always needed to have direct as-
surance from borrowers that they could immediately access cash, they would 
demand tough control rights from a borrower, which would be socially costly 
and may not be optimal from the point of view of governance. Douglas W. Dia-
mond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial 
Fragility: A Theory of Banking, 109 J. POL’Y ECON. 287, 287–88 (2001). Diamond 
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The interaction between the deposit-taking and loan-mak-
ing functions of banks is complex from the standpoint of banking 
theory. Conventionally, scholars posit a “linear” relationship be-
tween the amount of deposits held by a bank and the loans that 
the bank makes; in other words, banks use whatever depositor 
capital they have to lend, such that they are always “intermedi-
ating” capital flows.46  
This intermediation model is more complex than first meets 
the eye. As Professors Jakab and Kumhof observe, banks also 
create deposits when they lend money to a borrower.47 When a 
bank makes a loan to a borrower, it opens an account and depos-
its the funds in this account for the borrower’s use.48 Banks do 
not, therefore, debit money from a depositor’s account and credit 
it to the account of the borrower. Rather, banks create money by 
depositing loan funds in a new account.49 These funds are thus 
additional to those also available to the depositor. In issuing a 
new loan, a bank acquires an asset on its balance sheet because 
it is entitled to eventually be repaid on the loan by the bor-
rower.50 
In this way, banks can expansively create assets and liabil-
ities on their balance sheets. They do not need to show a direct 
debit from a saver to a credit on the borrower’s books. Instead, 
banks simply generate a new deposit entry on their ledger and 
 
and Rajan also note that the goal of mediating liquidity needs between deposi-
tors and borrowers over time helps explain why these two functions are com-
bined in the institution of a bank. Id. at 320. 
 46. John G. Gurley & Edward S. Shaw, Financial Aspects of Economic De-
velopment, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 515, 520–21 (1955); John G. Gurley & Edward S. 
Shaw, Financial Intermediaries and the Saving-Investment Process, 11 J. FIN. 
257, 258–59 (1956); James Tobin, Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money” 
(Cowles Found. Discussion Papers, Paper No. 159, 1963). Compare Jakab & 
Kumhof, supra note 42, at 2–3 (noting that banks are not intermediaries of loan-
able funds), with Paul Krugman, Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money”, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2013, 4:31PM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/ 
08/24/commercial-banks-as-creators-of-money (“Banks are just another kind of 
financial intermediary . . . .”). 
 47. Jakab & Kumhof, supra note 42, at 6–7. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Charles Goodhart, Whatever Became of the Monetary Aggregates?, 
Speech at the Peston Lecture in Honor of Maurice, Lord Peston (Feb. 28, 2007), 
in LSE Fin. Mkts. Group Paper Series, Feb. 2007, at 13 (noting the traditional 
reliance on the theory of banks as intermediates of capital and suggesting a 
better model as one where banks create money through lending and the creation 
of deposits); see also Hockett & Omarova, supra note 42 (pointing to the “fran-
chise” model where banks are franchised to distribute financing ultimately 
backstopped by the State). 
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add a corresponding asset to reflect a new source of revenue. As 
Jakab, Kumhof, and Pozsar note, without some positive con-
straint from regulation or the market placing a cost on their abil-
ities to create liabilities and new assets, banks can run up enor-
mous balance sheets in financial markets.51 
Provision of Financial Services: The place of banks at the 
center of deposit-taking and lending activity—with the informa-
tional advantages it provides—has supported an expansion in 
the financial services that banks offer.52 Beyond just taking de-
posits and providing loans, banks can harness their expertise 
and access to cheap funding (e.g., through deposits) to provide a 
range of financial services to a broad variety of clients.  
The “universal” banking model—where banks provide a 
spectrum of financial services—has become the norm in the 
United States and in Europe.53 Through networks of subsidiar-
ies, affiliates, and branches, banking groups routinely include 
 
 51. Jakab & Kumhof, supra note 42, at 5, 35; Zoltan Pozsar, Shadow Bank-
ing: The Money View 5 (Office of Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 14-04, 2014). 
 52. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt 
and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006) 
(noting that lenders play a powerful role in corporate governance); Michael R. 
Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical In-
vestigation, 64 J. FIN. 1657, 1661–63 (2009) (showing that lender interventions 
in governance can have positive economic benefits); George G. Triantis & 
Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1073 (1995) (highlighting the potency of lender signaling for con-
trolling managerial slack); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The 
Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
115, 119–20, 150–53 (2009) (noting that lenders often receive more information 
than corporate directors); Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Cove-
nants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 650 
(2009) (“[T]he business of lending has evolved, resulting in change in credit risk 
management and the creation of an increasingly liquid credit market.”). But cf. 
Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 
92 YALE L.J. 49, 67 (1982) (analyzing the agency costs of delegated monitoring 
of banks). 
 53. See generally Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Bank-
ing, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2013) [hereinafter 
Omarova, Merchants] (discussing the role of commercial banks in commodities 
trading and warehousing); Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Bank Activ-
ity and Funding Strategies: The Impact on Risk and Returns 2–4 (The World 
Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 4873, 2009) (noting the expansion 
of services that United States and European banks have provided since the 2008 
Financial Crisis). In the United States, under the Bank Holding Company Act 
of 1956, the commercial banking and investment banking operations of finance 
were kept separate, with bank holding companies restricted to performing ac-
tivities that were within the ambit of the “business of banking.” Pub. L. No. 84–
511, § 4, 70 Stat. 133, 135–37 (1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–43 (2012)). 
However, owing to an incremental set of changes and finally the Gramm-Leach-
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providers of financial advice, trading services in securities mar-
kets, securities underwriting, insurance, payments (e.g., issuing 
credit cards), lending to other financial firms, and so on. Banking 
firms can also trade for themselves, putting their own capital on 
the line to invest in markets.54 A full analysis of the broad ser-
vices portfolio of modern banking groups is outside the scope of 
this Article. However, it is worth underlining that banks have 
dramatically expanded their offerings far beyond the basic model 
of financial intermediation that undergirds their core function.55 
Banks have been particularly adept at broadening their 
scope of activities.56 They can access credit relatively cheaply, for 
example, through deposit funds or through their ability to bor-
row from other financial firms.57 They enjoy access to emergency 
funds from the Federal Reserve and protection for retail deposits 
through deposit insurance.58 Scholars have observed that larger 
banks generally benefit from lower funding costs because of an 
implicit expectation that regulators will not let such big banks 
 
Bliley Act of 1999, some bank holding companies could, if also able to be eligible 
as financial services holding companies, perform a series of financial services 
through subsidiaries. 12 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2012). For an excellent discussion of 
the history of the gradual expansion of the scope of “the business of banking” as 
well as the expansion in the range of services offered by banking firms, see Saule 
T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Prom-
ise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011) [here-
inafter Omarova, Unfulfilled Promise]. 
 54. However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act prohibits banks from “proprietary trading,” which provides a partial 
check on the bank’s ability to utilize its own funds for making investments. 12 
U.S.C. § 1851(a). This Act does not prohibit all aspects of proprietary trading, 
but it does define the prohibition to catch “short-term” transactions and allow 
for exceptions such as in the case of underwriting or market-making. 
Id. § 1851(h)(1). For a thorough analysis of these exceptions—collectively 
known as the Volcker Rule—and their effects, see Darrell Duffie, Market Mak-
ing Under the Proposed Volcker Rule (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Work-
ing Paper No. 106, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1990472&rec=1&srcabs=1925431&alg=1&pos=2, which discusses the impli-
cations of the Volcker Rule for market-making activities for banks; Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plumber”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Re-
form, 55 ARIZ. L REV. 53 (2013); and Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule 
and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2011), which dis-
cusses the impact of the Volcker Rule on the growth of shadow banking—the 
likely update of proprietary trading by nonbank institutions. 
 55. See Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, supra note 53. 
 56. See generally id. at 2–6 (investigating the impact of diversified banking 
approaches and how deposit, nondeposit, and wholesale funding from other fi-
nancial firms impacts a bank’s risk-return profile). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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collapse and renege on their debts.59 With this ready access to 
funds and the provision of a federal safety net, banks can offer 
financial services at lower costs to themselves than a nonbank. 
If banks can privately access cheap finance and use this money 
to sell services at a higher price, they can turn a profit. The 
cheaper their own funding costs, the better banks compete on the 
range of services and products that they might be able to offer.60 
Whether banks should be involved so extensively in finan-
cial services is a controversial question.61 This Article does not 
enter into this debate. Rather, it points to economic conditions—
such as cheaper financing and access to information—that have 
 
 59. The literature in this area is extensive. See, e.g., Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Harry Huizinga, Are Banks Too Big To Fail or Too Big To Save? International 
Evidence from Equity Prices and CDS Spreads, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 875 (2013) 
(showing that CDS spreads are lower for larger banks); Andrew G. Haldane, 
The $100 Billion Question, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 1, 3 (Mar. 
2010), http://www.bis.org/review/r100406d.pdf (noting that banks appear to 
show differences in “support ratings” or the perception that banks are likely to 
receive state support on account of size and market share); João A.C. Santos, 
Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” Subsidy, 20 FED. 
RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 29 (2014) (noting that between 1985 and 
2009, bond spreads appeared to be smaller for larger banks, suggesting that 
larger banks can often see a much lower cost of funding versus smaller banks 
and nonbank firms). But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LARGE BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES: EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 11–15 (2014) 
(noting that the extent of the funding advantage for larger firms may be growing 
smaller). 
 60. But see AZAR, ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 36 (noting that com-
mon ownership is encouraging anticompetitive behavior by banks in offering 
more expensive products to customers). However, cheaper funding costs for 
banks can enable them to theoretically use this funding to offer a range of fi-
nancial services, though anticompetitive behavior may encourage banks to seek 
out oligopolistic rents. 
 61. Numerous scholars have given historical overviews, cross-country com-
parisons, and outlines of the key policy trade-offs of applying the universal 
banking model to U.S. banks. See, e.g., RICARDO T. FERNHOLZ & CHRISTOFFER 
KOCH, WHY ARE BIG BANKS GETTING BIGGER? 8, 25 (2016) (noting that expan-
sion of banking services into the nonbanking area has helped reduce idiosyn-
cratic volatilities in particular asset groups); Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: 
Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357. 412 (2016) (advocating for nar-
row banking, where banks take deposits and invest this cash in safe assets); 
Omarova, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 53, at 1775 (contrasting the historical 
Glass-Steagall principle of organizational separation with universal banking); 
Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the United States: 
An Examination of Principal Issues, 8 FIN. MARKETS INSTITUTES & INSTRU-
MENTS 1, 9–12 (1999) (showing that the separation between banking and com-
merce had been eroding throughout the 1970s and 1980s); Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Huizinga, supra note 53, at 2–6 (noting the costs and benefits of universal bank-
ing and the advantages of diversification versus the risks). 
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made it possible for banking firms to adopt a universal model.62 
Over the last two decades, commercial banks have moved well 
beyond basic deposit-taking and lending to offer a range of ser-
vices.63 The 2008 Financial Crisis also saw the big investment 
banks, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Mor-
gan Stanley, and Bear Stearns collapse, become commercial 
banks, or join existing banking groups.64 As a result, the United 
States is home to some of the largest global banking groups, in-
cluding Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells 
Fargo, that specialize in offering a range of services of which de-
posit taking and lending constitute just one (usually less profit-
able)65 part. For example, in the third quarter of 2016, major 
U.S. banking groups saw dramatic revenue gains, not always 
owing to the usual banking functions, but to their role as dealers 
in global securities markets.66 In the case of J.P. Morgan, for ex-
ample, its community and consumer banking unit saw profits 
 
 62. Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, supra note 53. 
 63. See generally Omarova, Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 53 (discussing 
the history of the expansion in the range of services offered by banks). 
 64. See Patrick Kingsley, Financial Crisis: Timeline, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 
2012), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/07/credit-crunch-boom 
-bust-timeline. 
 65. See, e.g., Beverly J. Hirtle & Kevin J. Stiroh, The Return to Retail and 
the Performance of U.S. Banks, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1101, 1101–02, 1116–17 
(2007) (highlighting large U.S. banks and noting that retail banking operations 
are usually less volatile but less profitable for banks). 
 66. Dakin Campbell, Goldman Sachs Bond-Trading Engine Revs Up To 
Beat Estimates, BLOOMBERG L., Oct. 18, 2016 (noting a 49% increase in Gold-
man Sachs’s 2016 third quarter revenue in large part because of its rebound in 
bond trading); Hugh Son, JPMorgan Earnings Beat Estimates on Bond-Trading 
Revenue, BLOOMBERG L., Oct. 14, 2016; Olivia Oran & Sweta Singh, Morgan 
Stanley Profit Jumps on Bond-Trading Comeback, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-morgan-stanley-results-idUSKCN12J16C 
(noting that Morgan Stanley’s bond-trading revenue more than doubled in the 
2016 third quarter). It should be noted that Goldman Sachs, traditionally an 
investment bank without commercial banking operations before 2008, recently 
opened an online retail banking and lending operation. For further discussion, 
see Martin Neil Baily et al., The Big Four Banks: The Evolution of the Financial 
Sector, BROOKINGS INST., May 26, 2015. Put briefly, dealers help keep the mar-
ket running smoothly by mediating trades between buyers and sellers as well 
as standing ready to buy and sell securities with their own money to keep the 
markets trading smoothly. This function ensures that markets have liquidity 
and do not suffer from sudden, abnormal price spikes when there is a rush or 
large demand for securities. For a discussion of dealer operations, see Yesha 
Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968, 981–88 
(2016). 
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fall by 16%, with provisions made for credit losses of $1.29 bil-
lion, up from $389 million in 2015.67 By contrast, revenue from 
its securities trading services rose by 33% from the previous 
year, with revenues from bond trading growing at an astonishing 
48% from 2015.68 
2. The Problem of Banking Design 
Instability is a feature of the banking system. Banks medi-
ate temporal fluctuations in demand for and supply of cash. De-
positors must get their money on demand; borrowers need to lock 
in money for long-term projects. The need to manage these dual 
task—to deliver depositor money on demand and to also finance 
longer-term loans to borrowers—creates a fundamental instabil-
ity in banking.69 If depositors all need their money back at once, 
then banks cannot continue lending. And because they have to 
immediately pay depositors back, banks may have to call in the 
loans they have made.70 This instability thus reflects two key 
features of a bank’s function: (1) a temporal mismatch in issuing 
demand deposits and investing in longer-term borrower debt; 
and (2) the potential for sudden depositor demand for a return of 
their cash.71  
Banking scholars have devoted extensive study to this in-
stability. Professors Diamond and Dybvig point to panic as the 
major challenge of predicting bank runs and their seriousness.72 
Depositors do not know if they are going to get their money back 
if a bank looks like it is in trouble. Those who are first in line 
will be paid, and those who are slower may face uncertainties as 
to whether their money is safe. This dynamic can prompt depos-
itors to engage in anticipatory withdrawals simply to beat other 
depositors to the exit at the smallest sign of trouble. Depositors 
can be impervious to information in these circumstances. Even 
if information exists to correct a misperception of risk, depositors 
might still wish to get their money out. Worse, depositors might 
 
 67. Son, supra note 66. 
 68. Ben McLannahan, JPMorgan Buoyed by 33% Rise in Trading Revenues, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/08aade8c-91fe-11e6 
-8df8-d3778b55a923. 
 69. Diamond & Rajan, supra note 45. 
 70. Id. at 325. 
 71. See V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, Banking Panics, Information, and 
Rational Expectations Equilibrium, 43 J. FIN. 749 (1988); Douglas W. Diamond 
& Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. 
ECON. 401 (1983). 
 72. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 71, at 401–03. 
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well conflate problems at one bank as affecting every bank and 
rush to claim their money across firms. Such systemic disorder 
creates enormous costs for the market—too big for any single 
firm to control and too large to contain without calling in loans 
and selling assets at distressed prices.73 
Regulators have controlled these doomsday scenarios by 
providing insurance to customers to protect deposits (up to two 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars per account) and by giving 
banks access to emergency funding from the Federal Reserve.74 
Also, the fact that banks are large and diversified might be seen 
as providing protection against a collapse caused by large-scale 
depositor flight. If banks are able to derive revenue from multi-
ple business lines, then depositors may be less anxious if one or 
another were to fail: other sources of revenue could perhaps 
cushion the blow.75 Because of the potential for contagion, trou-
bles at one bank might signal trouble at other banks. In other 
industries (e.g., aviation),76 a competitor’s collapse should be a 
source of gain for those that remain. In banking, by contrast, the 
 
 73. Id. at 409–10. 
 74. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides deposit in-
surance to protect two hundred and fifty thousand dollars per customer and 
account. How Are My Deposit Accounts Insured by the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/categories.html (last updated Jan. 
31, 2018). It has been widely noted that this safety net has prevented runs suc-
cessfully in U.S. banking markets. See, e.g., Discount Window Lending, BOARD 
GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount 
-window.htm (last updated June 29, 2018). 
 75. I do not delve here into risks pertaining to the shadow banking system, 
where firms issue short-term deposits to other financial firms and then use 
these funds to invest in longer-term facilities—creating the kind of temporal 
mismatch seen in everyday retail banking. For a persuasive and insightful ac-
count of the risks of such money-like arrangements, see RICKS, supra note 4, at 
10–11. For a discussion of shadow banking, see GARY GORTON, SLAPPED IN THE 
FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: BANKING AND THE PANIC OF 2007 at 2–4 (2009), 
and ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., SHADOW BANKING (2012). On the repo market, see 
VIKTORIA BAKLANOVA ET AL., REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. REPO AND SECU-
RITIES LENDING MARKETS (2015), which describes the function of the repo mar-
ket and maturity transformation. On runs in the repo market, see Gary Gorton 
& Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on the Repo, 104 J. FIN. 
ECON. 425 (2012), and Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (Sizable) Role of 
Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 10/172, 2010). 
 76. See, e.g., Natalia Wojcik, Shares of United Fall for Second Day as Con-
troversy Lingers, CNBC (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/12/ 
shares-of-united-fall-for-second-day-as-controversy-lingers.html (noting that 
“[o]ther airlines saw a boost in their share prices” after a video went viral of a 
man being dragged off an overbooked United flight). 
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collapse of a major bank may well also push its competitors into 
distress, provoking a broader system-wide crisis.77 
B. BANKS AND CAPITAL REGULATION 
Bank regulation confronts several problems. First, major 
banks mediate an array of economic relationships. Second, re-
flecting this significance, regulation offers banks a safety net in 
the form of deposit insurance and access to emergency Federal 
Reserve funding. Firms can also receive ad hoc implicit support 
in the form of a bailout.78 Because of their economic stature, 
large banks can enjoy reduced funding costs, such that further 
growth may be more easily fueled by low-cost borrowing. Ulti-
mately, these dynamics create a set of well-recognized bad incen-
tives. An explicit or implicit safety net can motivate risk-taking 
by a bank, incentivizing reckless lending or expansion into prof-
itable but problematic areas of the market.79 Creditors too may 
be encouraged to lend more freely to a large bank, knowing they 
will be paid off by regulators in a bailout.80 
1. The Rationale for Capital Regulation 
Regulatory policy has responded to these tensions, in crucial 
part, by regulating how individual banks design their capital 
structure relative to the risks they take on.81 Regulation seeks 
to control how banks fund themselves. How much banks borrow, 
what kinds of securities they invest in, how much unencumbered 
cash they have, and their reliance on equity capital are, in large 
 
 77. Michael R. King, The Cost of Equity for Global Banks: A CAPM Perspec-
tive from 1990 to 2009, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 59, 59 (Sept. 
2009). 
 78. RICKS, supra note 4, at 95, 186. 
 79. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 71, at 416–17. 
 80. Levitin, supra note 13, at 486. 
 81. Shull, supra note 61 (discussing historical attempts to regulate banking 
through structural restrictions and as well as geographical restrictions on bank-
ing activity). Clearly, capital regulation is a central but by no means the only 
policy tool available to regulators. For example, bank regulation may target 
what kinds of activities a bank is qualified to perform. Activity-based re-
strictions underpin proposals to return banks to narrow banking or to Glass-
Steagall Act-type restrictions that policed the separation between banking and 
commercial activity. See Levitin, supra note 61 (justifying a narrow banking 
approach); Omarova, Merchants, supra note 53, at 279–80 (tracing the erosion 
of the Glass-Steagall Act and the role of banks in commodity markets). Addi-
tionally, regulators might tailor how they supervise banks to better control the 
risks that banks take on, such as through more consolidation supervision for 
larger banks. For discussion, see Krishnamurthy, supra note 44, at 3–4 (noting 
supervision by the Financial Stability Oversight Council as a regulatory tool). 
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part, a matter of public policy, not private decision making. The 
mix of debt-cash-equity in any bank’s capital structure is subject 
to careful regulation to determine whether it helps a bank with-
stand shocks and prevent bank failure.82 Capital regulation thus 
constitutes a touchstone in financial regulation. Indeed, as Pro-
fessor Tarullo has written, regulating whether a bank’s capital 
structure is adequate to the risks it assumes has come to be “the 
most important type of regulation” for maintaining financial sys-
tem safety.83  
Banks have an especially unusual capital structure by the 
fact of how they function.84 Bank deposits constitute loans to a 
bank that must be repayable on demand. Because a key source 
of bank funds represents an on-demand loan to the bank, a 
bank’s capital structure is naturally leveraged. Unlike a normal 
company that might be entirely funded by its shareholders, 
banks are creatures of debt as a constituting part of their capital 
structure. The risk of this debt is controlled, in part, by the avail-
ability of deposit insurance and emergency funds.85 
Counterintuitively, banks make money from the debt they 
extend to others (e.g., the loans they make to borrowers). These 
assets generate profits through interest repayments and fees. 
They can also generate losses. If a bank makes overly-risky 
loans, then borrowers may not repay. If these losses look like 
 
 82. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2010); Basel Regulatory 
Framework, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
supervisionreg/basel/USImplementation.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2017). 
 83. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL 15 (2008) (“[C]apital adequacy 
requirements have become the most important type of regulation designed to 
protect bank safety and soundness.”). 
 84. The axiomatic Modigliani-Miller Theorem in corporate finance states 
that the mix of debt and equity within a firm does not affect the firm’s funda-
mental value. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Cor-
poration Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
In the absence of transaction costs like taxation, legal enforceability, and so on, 
whether a company finances itself using debt or equity should not impact its 
value. Scholars have long debated whether the Modigliani-Miller Theorem ap-
plies in the case of banking firms. See, e.g., Sofiane Aboura & Emmanuel Lepi-
nette, Do Banks Satisfy the Modigliani-Miller Theorem?, 35 ECON. BULL. 924 
(2015) (arguing the Modigliani-Miller Theorem does not apply to banks). 
Bluntly put, if it does apply, then increasing bank equity should come at little 
cost to overall bank profitability. Conversely, if it does not apply, there is an 
argument for thinking about these varying costs in determining regulatory re-
quirements for bank capital. This Article does not get into the debate of whether 
the Modigliani-Miller Theorem should apply to banks or what the optimal mix 
of debt and equity should be for capital regulation. 
 85. See Krishnamurthy, supra note 44, at 3–5 (explaining supervision by 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council). 
  
612 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:587 
 
they might imperil the bank’s future, then depositors will move 
quickly to recover their deposits and cause the bank to fail.86 
Capital buffers provide protection against the instability of 
a bank’s capital structure and the chance that a run might cause 
insolvency.87 As Professor Tarullo notes, capital buffers offer pro-
tection against the rapid insolvency of a bank on account of ex-
pected losses caused by bad loans.88 They also provide comfort to 
those that lend money to banks and that can feel confident about 
repayment. A reserve of capital should thus help reduce the costs 
that banks pay to borrow money.89 
The difficulty lies in calculating how much capital a bank 
should keep and what assets should count as capital for the sake 
of the safety buffer. If banks must set aside capital as part of 
their activities, they internalize a compliance cost as part of their 
business. If a bank perceives these costs as being too high, it 
might lend less or sell off existing loans to reduce the risks on its 
books. Reduced lending or a sell-off of loans might dampen the 
flow of credit and hurt economic activity. Conversely, if the 
buffer only includes low-quality assets (like junk bonds or vola-
tile currencies) then the safety it offers is illusory. In such cases, 
the costs that a bank does internalize are insufficient to reflect 
the risks it takes. A bad capital buffer can transfer the risks of a 
dangerous bank onto the public purse (that must pay depositors 
through insurance) as well as to the bank’s creditors who are not 
repaid on what they are owed. 
2. Equity Funding in Capital Regulation 
Global regulators have generally agreed on common stand-
ards for how much capital international banks must keep and 
what kind of capital ought to be included within the buffer.90 
Since the late 1980s, policymakers have developed and imple-
mented a series of Basel Capital Accords that establish the 
method by which capital must be calculated and the amount and 
composition of the capital buffer.91 Most recently, this effort has 
 
 86. King, supra note 77, at 59. 
 87. TARULLO, supra note 83, at 16–18. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Stavros Gadinis & Thom Wetzer, Basel III: Softer Rules, Harder Insti-
tutions 3–6 (Sept. 24, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 91. TARULLO, supra note 83, at 2–44 (providing a history of the Basel rule-
making process and the rationales driving the creation of Basel I and Basel II 
Capital Accords and the benefits and drawbacks of the Basel approach); see also 
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culminated in the Basel III Accord, formulated as part of post-
Crisis reform and implemented into U.S. law through the Dodd-
Frank Act and the Federal Reserve’s piecemeal rulemaking.92 
Scholars have written extensively about the Basel Accords and 
their effectiveness.93 This Article does not revisit these debates. 
Rather, it identifies a marked shift in international capital reg-
ulation towards greater reliance on common equity as an essen-
tial part of the capital buffer. This focus on common equity capi-
tal aligns with concurrent efforts by regulators to ensure that 
banks are structured to be wound down without cost to the fi-
nancial system.94 As equity buffers grow thicker, their protective 
cushion should absorb losses and ensure that creditors have 
value from which they will get repaid. 
Calculating Capital: Somewhat counterintuitively, regula-
tors do not look to a bank’s liabilities (i.e. deposits) when working 
out how much capital it should keep—these are underwritten by 
the public safety net.95 Rather, they look to a bank’s assets—the 
loans that the bank makes.96 These represent the source of a 
 
CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW, AND FI-
NANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 99–102 
(2014); CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 77–79 (2015) (discussing international rulemak-
ing and the “legal” character of international regulatory accords); Stavros Gadi-
nis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulatory, and Ministry 
Networks, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & 
David T. Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 211 (2006) (noting the role of international networks in implementing 
regulatory agreements); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of Inter-
national Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405 (2013) (analyzing the objec-
tives of international financial regulation and assessing its successes and short-
comings in the framing of its core objectives). 
 92. 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2012); see Basel Regulatory Framework, supra note 82 
(listing announcements detailing the Federal Reserve’s piecemeal rulemaking). 
 93. See TARULLO, supra note 83, at 7–13 (discussing the effectiveness of 
Basel I and II); see also HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, 
GLOBAL BANK REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 137–81 (2010). 
 94. See TARULLO, supra note 83, at 17–19 (discussing broadly the role of 
bank equity in controlling bank risk-taking and absorbing losses); see also Doug-
las J. Elliot, Higher Bank Capital Requirements Would Come at a Price, BROOK-
INGS (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/research/higher-bank-capital 
-requirements-would-come-at-a-price (noting the broad theoretical arguments 
for and against common equity and bank safety and soundness). 
 95. This was not always the case. From the 1900s through the 1930s, reg-
ulators examined the capital-deposit ratio. TARULLO, supra note 83, at 29–30; 
see also YAIR E. ORGLER & BENJAMIN WOLKOWITZ, BANK CAPITAL 8–29 (1976) 
(providing insights into the definition and functions of capital). 
 96. See TARULLO, supra note 83, at 29 (comparing current practice with 
earlier practice). 
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bank’s profits but also the source of risk as bad lending decisions 
can push a bank towards default.97 
International regulators have broadly agreed on how to 
work out the riskiness of bank assets and the capital that banks 
need to keep.98 To quantify the riskiness of assets, regulation as-
signs “a risk rating” to different types of loans.99 A loan to a de-
veloped country should be much less risky than a loan to a start-
up company and credit to a top-rated company less risky than 
credit to a poorly performing one.100 The amount of capital that 
a bank should keep can be determined by reference to this risk 
rating and risk weighting. For example, a one hundred thousand 
dollar loan to a top-rated company might be rated at a risk rate 
of 20%. Applying the 20% risk rating, the loan might be seen as 
having a notional risk weighted value of twenty thousand dol-
lars—its “riskiness.” The amount of capital that a bank sets 
aside can be determined as a percentage of the riskiness on the 
bank’s balance sheet. 
In the case of both Basel I and Basel II, regulators asked 
that banks set aside capital equal to 8% of all risk-weighted as-
sets on their books.101 And of this 8%, 4% was required to be com-
prised of so-called Tier 1 (that is, the safest) capital—fully paid 
up common equity and disclosed reserves.102 The rest could be 
made of Tier 2 capital—a wider category of capital that included 
less safe but viable types of assets like undisclosed reserves.103 
 
 97. See id. at 17–19. 
 98. See id. at 55–56 (discussing the agreements at the heart of Basel I and 
II); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLE-
MENTS, BASEL III: FINALIZING POST-CRISIS REFORMS (2017), https://www.bis 
.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf. 
 99. See TARULLO, supra note 83, at 55–56. 
 100. This methodology largely reflects the blunt Basel I and Basel II foun-
dational Internal Ratings-Based approaches, which were fairly crude in estab-
lishing riskiness for different borrowers depending on the type of borrower (Ba-
sel I) or a borrower’s credit rating (Basel II). See TARULLO, supra note 83, at 55–
56. In reality, larger banks use the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach, 
where calculating riskiness is determined by sophisticated models of default 
risk. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE INTERNAL 
RATINGS-BASED APPROACH (2001), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf (de-
scribing the Internal Ratings-Based Approach as implemented by large banks). 
The example, above, is therefore highly simplified and unlikely to reflect the 
approach of large banks. Professor Tarullo provides a discussion of this ap-
proach and methodology. See TARULLO, supra note 83, 55–60. 
 101. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Capital Standards for Banks: 
The Evolving Basel Accord, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 395, 396 (2003), https://www 
.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0903lead.pdf. 
 102. TARULLO, supra note 83, at 55–60. 
 103. Id. 
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Taking the above example, the one hundred thousand dollar 
loan, risk-weighted at twenty thousand dollars, would need a 
bank to keep one thousand six hundred dollars in capital of 
which eight hundred dollars must be in the form of fully paid up 
equity or disclosed reserves. 
The first two iterations of the Basel Accords have come in 
for strident critique—not surprising given their failure to pre-
vent the Crisis.104 Pre-Crisis capital buffers proved woefully in-
sufficient.105 As Professor Acharya observes, the six U.S. firms 
suffering the largest write-downs of their assets saw around 
$696 billion worth of losses between March 2007 and June 
2010.106 Between June 2007 and December 2008, the market 
value of these six firms was down, on average, by 88% and they 
veered towards a close or near total collapse, with greater liabil-
ities than equity could support.107  
Post-Crisis financial regulation has turned to equity funding 
as the solution.108 Post-Crisis, scholars and policymakers have 
advocated for thicker capital buffers that are more fully funded 
by common equity.109 In influential writings, Professors Admati, 
 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 64–72 (detailing the shortcomings of Basel I). See gener-
ally ROBERT JARROW, A CRITIQUE OF REVISED BASEL II (2006), https://www 
.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/bank-research-conference/annual-6th/jarrowr.pdf. 
 105. SCOTT STRAH, JENNIFER HYNES & SANDERS SHAFFER, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF BOS., THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE CAPITAL 
POSITIONS OF LARGE U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 20 (2013) (noting that the 
capital cushions of major banks depleted rapidly during the Crisis). 
 106. Viral V. Acharya, Adapting Micro Prudential Regulation for Emerging 
Markets, in DEALING WITH THE CHALLENGES OF MACRO FINANCIAL LINKAGES 
IN EMERGING MARKETS 57, 69 (Octaviano Canuto & Swati R. Ghosh eds., 2013). 
 107. Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unin-
tended Consequences, and Lessons for Emerging Markets (Asian Dev. Bank 
Inst., Working Paper No. 392, 2012), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/ 
publication/156247/adbi-wp392.pdf; see also Allen N. Berger et al., How Do 
Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios? 34 J. FIN. SERV. 
RES. 123, 147–48 (2008) (noting that large U.S. bank holding companies were 
keeping much higher levels of capital than the requirements under Basel I and 
Basel II). 
 108. STRAH, HYNES & SHAFFER, supra note 105; see also Acharya, supra note 
107, at 19. 
 109. See Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the 
Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive 3 
(Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2065, 2013) [hereinafter 
Admati et al., Fallacies], https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/ 
working-papers/fallacies-irrelevant-facts-myths-discussion-capital-regulation 
-why; see also ANAT R. ADMATI & MARTIN F. HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW 
CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 30 (2013) 
[hereinafter ADMATI, BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES] (noting that 19th century bank-
ing relied on shareholder funding to drive lending business, rather than just 
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DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer have argued for deep equity 
cushions.110 They point to past eras of banking when equity rou-
tinely funded 40%–50% of bank business.111 While the authors 
stop short of proposing hard benchmarks, they clearly consider 
modern-day levels of shareholder equity as falling woefully 
short.112 They are not alone. Professors Hanson, Kashyap, and 
Stein, for example, propose the creation of plentiful counter-cy-
clical capital buffers that banks build up in good times to main-
tain their businesses during downturns.113 They, too, highlight 
the significance of good quality capital, singling out common eq-
uity as a major protection against future crisis.114 Common eq-
uity—rather than preferred stock or even long-term debt—is 
viewed as giving banks the best chance of surviving a fallout.115 
The funds raised are readily available, without any commitment 
to set aside cash for creditors or preferred shareholders.116 This 
buffer—rather than being expensive—can reduce a bank’s riski-
ness and funding costs.117 A reserve of equity can also reassure 
a bank’s funding providers and help to lower its credit risk and 
borrowing costs.118 
 
deposits); Anat R. Admati et al., The Leverage Ratchet Effect, 73 J. FIN. 145, 
145–46 (2018) [hereinafter, Admati et al., Leverage] (noting the tendency of 
shareholders to push for leverage-driven growth).  
 110. Admati et al., Fallacies, supra note 109. 
 111. Id.; see also ADMATI, BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES, supra note 109. 
 112. Admati et al., Fallacies, supra note 109; see also ADMATI, BANKERS’ 
NEW CLOTHES, supra note 109; Admati et al., Leverage, supra note 109. 
 113. Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macropru-
dential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 7–9 (2011). 
 114. Id.; see also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for 
Large Financial Institutions, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 453, 456 (2011) (proposing 
a new methodology for calculating bank capital that requires banks to maintain 
equity and long-term debt levels at a high enough level that the credit default 
swap (CDS) prices on junior long-term bank debt stays above a preset level, with 
the possibility that banks must issue new equity to reflect the added risk if the 
CDS prices rise). There remain criticisms of the view that higher capital re-
quirements are necessarily the answer to solve banking crisis. For example, 
commentators note that the proposals do not fully account for the potential re-
duction in lending that may follow and a lack of clarity with respect to the ob-
jective of bank regulation—saving banks from a crisis or ensuring they are po-
sitioned to continue working and lending. See Krishnamurthy, supra note 44, 
at 4–6; see also Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic Risk Through Reform of Capital 
Regulation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 763, 767 (2010). 
 115. Hanson, Kashyap & Stein, supra note 113, at 7–9. 
 116. Id. at 9. 
 117. Admati et al., Leverage, supra note 109, at 145–46. 
 118. Admati et al., Fallacies, supra note 109, at 13–19; see Hanson, Kashyap 
& Stein, supra note 113, at 17–21 (noting that the impact of higher equity is 
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Basel III increases the required level of common equity from 
pre-Crisis levels, with extra equity safety buffers and counter-
cyclical capital charges mandated for the largest, most systemi-
cally significant global banks.119 Basel III introduces a new cat-
egory of gold-plated capital—the Common Equity Tier 1 (or 
CET1) that focuses only on the value of common equity, the 
share premium attached to equity as well as retained earn-
ings.120 Preferred stock is not included within this calculation.121 
In addition to formalizing common equity as the top-tier capital 
type, Basel III requires an increase in the Tier 1 and CET1 buff-
ers for banks.122 Rather than keep to a thin 4% Tier 1 buffer, 
Basel III requires that common equity (CET1) alone fund a min-
imum reserve of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets (RWA) and a capi-
tal conservation buffer of 2.5%.123 Large global banks may also 
be asked to hold 0%–0.25% CET1 as part of a countercyclical 
capital buffer and another 0%–2.5% CET1 as a charge to account 
for the risk created by their size and stature.124 When finally im-
plemented, Basel III should thus cause the largest banking firms 
to maintain a minimum of 12% of risk-weighted capital in the 
form of common equity.125 On top of this, Basel III expects banks 
to keep at least 1.5% of RWA in the form of general Tier 1 assets 
and a further 2% in the form of Tier 2 assets.126 
Notably, the Federal Reserve mandates higher-than-Basel 
CET1 charges for eight U.S. banking groups designated as being 
systemically important for global markets (a G-SIB charge).127 
 
marginal for bank funding costs because bank riskiness should decrease due to 
more equity). 
 119. See DAVISPOLK, U.S. BASEL III FINAL RULE: VISUAL MEMORANDUM 20–
21 (2015), https://www.davispolk.com/files/u.s.basel_.iii_.final_.rule_.visual 
.memo_.pdf; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2012). 
 120. Basel III specifies additional criteria as to what counts as CET1, nota-
bly including qualifying minority ownership interests in consolidated depository 
institutions as well as deductions, such as for goodwill, to seek out a focus on 
tangible common equity. See DAVISPOLK, supra note 119, at 25. 
 121. PWC, RISK & CAPITAL MANAGEMENT UNDER BASEL III 5–6 (2011), 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/banking-capital-markets/pdf/workshop_session_1 
.pdf. It should be noted that noncumulative, perpetual preferred stock is grand-
fathered into the category of Tier 1 but not CET1 capital. DAVISPOLK, supra 
note 119, at 9–10. 
 122. DAVISPOLK, supra note 119, at 20–21. 
 123. Id. at 21. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 9–10; PWC, supra note 121, at 5–6. 
 126. DAVISPOLK, supra note 119, at 21. 
 127. These banks are Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells 
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Rather than charge its banks the Basel III-maximum of 2.5% 
CET1 for being large and important, the Federal Reserve’s rule 
permits a higher maximum of between 1%–4.5% CET1 capital 
for its largest and most impactful constituents.128 Of the eight 
designated U.S. banks, JPMorgan Chase is set to eventually in-
cur the maximum 4.5% CET1 G-SIB charge with others paying 
incrementally lower charges depending on their size and pro-
file.129 In preparation for this ramping-up of demand for equity, 
major U.S. banking groups are well on their way to raising the 
equity necessary to support their business.130 
Post-Crisis reform also relies on capital buffers to allow for 
the orderly resolution of failing firms.131 Under the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), a center-piece of 
post-2008 regulatory architecture, thick equity capital buffers 
are essential.132 Under the OLA, equity reserves absorb bank 
losses and fund the wind down of a failing bank, until such time 
as its assets can be sold and restructured.133 This means that 
equity is used to pay off creditors and depositors.134 To the extent 
that any value remains in the equity of a bank holding company 
after paying off obligations, it will be used by regulators to fund 
the reorganized bank.135 Put simply, common equity faces an ex-
 
Fargo. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve 
Board Approves Final Rule Requiring the Largest, Most Systemically Im-
portant U.S. Bank Holding Companies to Further Strengthen Their Capital Po-
sitions (July 20, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
pressreleases/bcreg20150720a.htm. 
 128. DAVISPOLK, supra note 119, at 21. 
 129. PWC, FIRST TAKE: KEY POINTS FROM THE FED’S FINAL G-SIB SUR-
CHARGE RULE (2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory 
-services/publications/assets/final-g-sib-surcharge-rule.pdf. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a) (2012) (beginning the process after agreement be-
tween the FDIC, the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve). 
 132. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13; Morrison, supra note 11; see also 
Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bank-
ruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy 
Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 641–44 (2005) (providing an early pre-
Crisis examination of the operation of the safe harbors for derivatives contracts 
under the Bankruptcy Code); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment 
Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 566 (2011) (not-
ing the role of derivatives safe harbors under the Bankruptcy Code in poten-
tially amplifying risk-taking in the financial system). 
 133. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384(a), 5386(5), 5392(a), 5392(c) (“[C]reditors and share-
holders will bear the losses of the covered financial company.”). 
 134. Id. §§ 5386, 5390(b). 
 135. Id. § 5390(b). 
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tinction event if the OLA is invoked to wind down a large finan-
cial institution.136  
In sum, common equity constitutes a foundation on which 
safer, more resilient financial institutions are grounded post-
Crisis. Under Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act, common equity 
constitutes the essential pillar supporting an orderly wind down 
of a complex financial institution. Indeed, for a cohort of influen-
tial scholars and policymakers, the problem with today’s finan-
cial system lies not in the fact of this reliance, but rather in its 
lack of ambition.137 In other words, existing demands for equity 
in financial regulation do not go far enough—and banks should 
raise a bigger capital buffer comprised more heavily of funding 
from common equity. 
II.  ASSET MANAGERS AS BANK EQUITY SUPPLIERS   
With increased demands for common equity, capital mar-
kets have assumed enormous significance in supplying the re-
sources needed to keep financial markets protected.138 Despite 
this importance, however, surprisingly little attention has gone 
into constructing a picture of which investors supply this capital 
in practice.139 With bank equity investors assuming an essential 
role in maintaining financial market safety and soundness, fill-
ing in this gap is critical in order to understand who holds the 
ultimate default risk of financial firms and how effectively they 
can bear this burden. 
This Part has three aims. First, it describes the ownership 
patterns of the largest twenty-six U.S. bank holding companies, 
 
 136. Id. The single point of entry design has faced numerous criticisms, such 
as whether or not it is actually workable in practice and how it might operate 
in the event of a subsidiary insolvency, rather than one in which the holding 
company can be placed in a receivership. Skeel, supra note 11, at 311–33; Der-
rick Cephas & Dimia Fogam, FDIC Issues ‘Single Point of Entry’ Resolution 
Strategy, WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES: LATEST THINKING (Mar. 24, 2014), http:// 
www.weil.com/articles/fdic-issues-single-point-of-entry-resolution-strategy. 
 137. Admati et al., Fallacies, supra note 109, at 3. 
 138. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal 
Reserve Board Releases Results of Supervisory Bank Stress Tests (June 22, 
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg2017062 
2a.htm. 
 139. See AZAR, ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 36, at 1–2 (noting high 
common ownership in banking from the perspective of antitrust policy); see also 
Elhauge, supra note 36, at 1268 (showing the prevalence of horizontal share-
holding in the banking industry). 
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part of the thirty-four U.S. and foreign holding companies sub-
ject to the Federal Reserve’s 2017 stress tests.140 It looks at 
shareholders of over 5% of the common equity of these holding 
companies (blockholders), as listed in their proxy statements for 
2011 and 2017.141 
This survey shows that the largest U.S. bank holding com-
panies are owned to increasing degrees by blockholders from 
2011 to 2017. Further, these block ownership stakes are focused 
in the hands of a small cohort of asset management companies: 
BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, T. Rowe Price, and Van-
guard.142 This Article does not advance any particular causal ac-
count to explain why some asset managers have grown their 
block equity stakes in the financial sector. It simply observes 
that a group of asset managers now features as repeat block eq-
uity owners of the largest U.S. banks, meaning that the funds 
they manage are now directly exposed to the risk of these big 
banks failing. 
Second, this Part provides a descriptive outline of the asset 
management industry, its function and the general corporate 
governance practices espoused by its key members. As shown by 
the survey, asset managers—as block investors across a number 
of banks—are now critical to the health of banking. How they 
exercise their governance power matters for the safety and 
soundness of the entire financial system. 
Third, this Part lays the groundwork for the argument that 
asset managers constitute shareholders that cannot afford to fail 
in their oversight role in financial regulation.143 By representing 
the economic interests of fund holders at multiple banking firms, 
the governance exercised by asset managers has enormous im-
pact. How effectively asset managers perform this task matters 
for the health of financial markets as for the savers, who through 
 
 140. See Press Release, supra note 138. 
 141. This 2011 list does not include Citizens Financial Group, which was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the United Kingdom’s Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBOS) until 2015, when RBOS sold its stake in Citizens Financial Group. Dex-
heimer, supra note 15. The 2011 list also does not include CIT Group which 
reemerged from bankruptcy as an FDIC-insured bank holding company in late 
2011. Touryalai, supra note 15. 
 142. See Elhauge, supra note 36, at 1268 (identifying four of these firms in 
particular). 
 143. This terminology references, in part, the “common ownership” litera-
ture, advanced by antitrust economics to describe the widespread ownership of 
U.S. companies by BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street Global, T. Rowe Price, and 
Vanguard. See generally Azar, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 36, at 1514 
(using “common ownership” terminology). 
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their fund holdings, have assumed the residual default risk of 
large parts of the U.S. banking system. 
A. ASSET MANAGERS IN THE ECONOMY 
1. What is Asset Management? 
Asset managers look after and invest the wealth of savers 
using a variety of skills and strategies. Instead of individuals 
setting aside a portion of their monthly wages to invest person-
ally, they can pay a professional asset manager a fee to do so on 
their behalf.144 By pooling the money and assets of millions of 
savers—both retail and corporate—asset managers cultivate ex-
pertise and market power to make investments in capital, cur-
rency, and other markets.145 
The kinds of products that asset managers offer their cus-
tomers are varied and designed to cater to different investment 
objectives and risk appetites. For example, mutual funds repre-
sent the quintessential savings and money management prod-
uct. Mutual funds pool savings and use this money to invest in 
diversified portfolios of stocks, bonds, and securities.146 Mutual 
fund clients can usually redeem the value of their investments 
by cashing in the shares that mutual funds issue to them, repre-
senting their particular entitlement within the fund.147 Depend-
ing on the fund, investors can choose between those that offer a 
more active trading strategy and those that are passive.148 In the 
case of active management, managers promise expertise in pick-
ing and choosing specific stocks or other securities to generate 
returns for the fund.149 For passive funds, by contrast, the value 
of the pool is benchmarked to the performance of a reference bas-
ket of securities (like a selected group of stocks in the S&P 
 
 144. Professor Morley provides a more detailed description and analysis of 
fund organization. See Morley, supra note 19, at 1232 (noting the significance 
of the separation of funds and managers as the defining feature of investment 
pools and discussing the governance implications of this separation). 
 145. See generally WILLIAM BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY 
WE SAVE NOW (2016) (providing an insightful history and introduction to mu-
tual funds). 
 146. Morley, supra note 19, at 1234. 
 147. Closed-end mutual funds, in contrast to open-ended mutual funds, do 
not permit their customers to freely redeem their investment and cash out. Id. 
 148. What Are Mutual Funds?, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/learning 
-center/investment-products/mutual-funds/what-are-mutual-funds (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2018). 
 149. Id. 
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500).150 In any event, as a product critical to the long-term eco-
nomic well-being of tens of millions of mom-and-pop and corpo-
rate savers, mutual funds are subject to regulation under the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) and by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).151 Within the parameters laid out 
by the ICA and overseen by the SEC, asset management compa-
nies can offer customers mutual fund products, specifying strat-
egy, likely riskiness, and redemption terms.152 The likes of 
BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street Global, and Vanguard have 
emerged as specialist mutual fund management companies, of-
fering their customers a choice of funds within which to place 
their savings.153 
In addition to mutual funds, asset managers include hedge 
funds and private equity funds.154 These firms also pool assets 
for investment.155 However, by limiting themselves to a cohort of 
wealthy investors, hedge funds and private equity funds face a 
less exacting regulatory environment than mutual funds that ex-
pressly cater to a much wider swath of the public.156 Allowed to 
deploy a range of strategies, including those that may be too 
risky for mutual funds, hedge funds and private equity houses 
can provide asset management for institutions as well as wealth-
ier investors with a higher risk tolerance.157 
 
 150. For example, exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, usually provide passive 
management strategies where the value of the fund tracks an underlying index. 
William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A 
Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
69, 73–85 (2008) (discussing ETFs and their role in the securities market); see 
also Andrew Osterland, Investors Pouring Billions into Passively Managed 
Funds, CNBC (June 27, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/27/more 
-investors-are-making-the-switch-to-passively-managed-etfs.html (noting that 
in 2015 and 2016, actively managed funds saw a dramatic exit of $308 billion, 
while passive funds like ETFs saw $375 billion in inflows). 
 151. Morley, supra note 19, at 1233–36 (noting mutual funds must comply 
with SEC regulations); FIDELITY, supra note 148. 
 152. FIDELITY, supra note 148. 
 153. The World’s 500 Largest Asset Managers – Year End 2014, WILLIS TOW-
ERS WATSON (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC 
-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2015/11/The-worlds-500-largest-asset 
-managers-year-end-2014 (providing a ranking of the top twenty asset manag-
ers). 
 154. See Morley, supra note 19, at 1235–36 (describing hedge and private 
equity funds). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. This is not to suggest that hedge funds and private equity funds are not 
subject to securities regulation. While oversight under the ICA is lowered, ow-
ing to a smaller, wealthier clientele, hedge funds remain subject, inter alia, to 
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As of December 2014, the value of assets in U.S. investment 
pools came to around $25.8 trillion.158 This included $13.1 tril-
lion in the U.S. mutual fund industry as well as $3.4 trillion in 
hedge funds.159 These numbers, however, tell just a part of the 
story. 
Mutual funds, in particular, tether the wealth of Main 
Street homes and businesses to the fortunes of global capital 
markets. An extraordinary amount of U.S. household wealth is 
entrusted to the management of mutual funds. In all, in mid-
2015, 43% of all U.S. households owned shares in mutual funds, 
totaling around 53.6 million householders.160 In the United 
States, 91 million individuals owned shares in mutual funds.161 
The baby boomer generation, edging closer to retirement, consti-
tutes the demographic with the largest share of mutual fund as-
sets, though younger generations are investing earlier than gen-
erations past.162 These figures point to a dramatic deepening in 
the relationship between American households and asset man-
agement.163 For example, whereas investment companies man-
aged just 2% of all American household financial assets in 1980, 
they oversaw around 22% of such assets by year-end 2015.164 
 
the usual prohibitions against fraud, insider trading, market manipulation, and 
disruption in their trading activities as well as other regulations with respect 
to how they trade, client funds, and disclosure practices. See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N., SEC PUB. NO. 139 (2/13), INVESTOR BULLETIN: HEDGE FUNDS 3–5 
(2012), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_hedgefunds.pdf. 
 158. This figure excludes assets in money market mutual funds. FIN. STA-
BILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, UPDATE ON REVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT 
PRODUCTS AND ACTIVITIES 3–4 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%20of%20Asset%20 
Management%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf; see also RISK & EXAMINA-
TIONS OFFICE, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC PRIVATE FUND STATISTICS, FOURTH 
CALENDAR QUARTER 2014, at 14 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
investment/private-funds-statistics/private-funds-statistics-2014-q4.pdf (exam-
ining private funds). 
 159. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 158, at 3. 
 160. INV. CO. INST., 2016 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (2016) [herein-
after INV. CO. INST., FACT BOOK]. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 9–14, 112–20; see also INV. CO. INST., PROFILE OF MUTUAL FUND 
SHAREHOLDERS 2008 3–27 (2008) [hereinafter INV. CO. INST., PROFILE]. 
 163. Those managing 401(k) defined benefit plans or individual retirement 
accounts exemplify this trend. See INV. CO. INST., PROFILE, supra note 162, at 
3–27. 
 164. INV. CO. INST., FACT BOOK, supra note 160, at 11–13. Under the Invest-
ment Company Institute’s definition of investment companies, these holdings 
include assets in exchange-traded funds (ETFs), unit investment trust funds, 
closed-end funds, and mutual funds. Id. 
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Importantly, mutual fund assets165—managed on behalf of 
U.S. homes and businesses—are critical investors in the long-
term future of corporate America. Most mutual fund assets are 
invested for the long-term, with 56% of assets placed in long-
term equity funds.166 Around 41% of the 56% of assets held in 
long-term equity funds were invested in domestic U.S. corpora-
tions at year-end 2015.167 The tribulations of securities markets 
thus impact mutual fund performance. In 2008, following the Fi-
nancial Crisis, mutual funds finished the year managing $10.3 
trillion in assets, a decrease of almost $2.6 trillion from the year 
before, as savers pulled their investments and cashed out during 
the turmoil.168 With the near 40% decline in stock prices in 2008, 
U.S. equity mutual funds also found themselves suddenly 
poorer, leaving the households that invested in them facing deep 
uncertainty about the future of their 401(k)s and other sav-
ings.169 
2. Asset Managers in Corporate Governance 
With mutual funds channeling an enormous amount of sav-
ings capital into equity and other securities, capital markets 
have experienced a sharp shift towards a near complete institu-
tionalization of the investor base. As Professor Zingales notes, 
whereas only around 10% of all stock market investors in the 
1930s were institutions, this figure has risen to over 70% in re-
cent years.170 In administering large pools of household and 
 
 165. This includes assets held by mutual funds and ETFs. 
 166. Id. 
 167. INV. CO. INST., FACT BOOK, supra note 160, at 8–9. These figures in-
clude assets in ETFs, a generally more passive type of investment vehicle that 
tracks the performance of underlying indices. See Morley, supra note 19, 1235–
36 (discussing ETFs); see also Birdthistle, supra note 150, at 71–75. 
 168. INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 8 (2009), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf. 
 169. Id. at 8–9 (showing that, while equity funds suffered losses, there were 
inflows into fixed-income (debt) oriented funds during the Crisis). 
 170. Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 
391, 392 (2009); see also INV. CO. INST., FACT BOOK, supra note 160, at 11–13; 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1530–50 (1997) (examining the role and influence of pen-
sion funds on capital markets and governance); Clifford G. Holderness, The 
Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378 
(2009) (noting that almost 90% of S&P 500 companies include institutional 
blockholders as part of the ownership structure); Paul G. Mahoney, The Politi-
cal Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2001) (noting the 
incidence of information-insensitivity and exuberance driving poor investor de-
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other savings through the mutual funds they offer, asset manag-
ers make decisions about how and where to invest capital en-
trusted to their care.171 In return, they earn management and 
advisory fees.172 As Professor Morley writes, individual mutual 
funds are usually members of much larger networks of “fund 
families” organized, managed, and advised under the brand of 
an asset manager like BlackRock, Fidelity, or Vanguard.173 A 
public company may receive equity investments from multiple 
different funds from an asset manager’s fund family.174 For ex-
ample, an S&P 500 healthcare company may see investment 
from a BlackRock fund that passively invests in a cross-section 
of S&P 500 stock. The company might also see investment from 
another BlackRock fund devoted to actively picking profitable 
healthcare stocks. In general, however, asset managers like 
BlackRock tend to represent all of their funds as the legal share-
holder of record.175 This, in turn, means the asset manager holds 
the voting and decision-making power on behalf of all of its funds 
and can choose to wield this power on behalf of its funds as one 
joint bloc.176 
The significance of asset managers as shareholders in public 
markets inevitably draws into relief questions about how they 
exercise their governance power. As Professors Gilson and Gor-
don observe, the dominance of these institutional investors in 
the modern American corporation has diminished the descrip-
tive power of the Berle-Means public company.177 As Berle and 
Means famously observed, the Anglo-American corporation is 
characterized by a dispersed base of shareholders and a result-
ing agency conflict between managers and the shareholder-own-
ers on whose behalf they run the company.178 By this account, a 
 
cision-making); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Rule 10b of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 390–410 (1990) (describing the growth 
of U.S. securities markets from largely unsophisticated origins, with investors 
motivated by quick and easy returns). 
 171. Morley, supra note 19, at 1239. 
 172. Id. at 1238. 
 173. Id. at 1239. 
 174. Cf. id. (noting the thousands of separate funds operated by manage-
ment companies). 
 175. See id. at 1238–39. 
 176. Id. at 1232–34. 
 177. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 35, at 874 (arguing that the Berle-Means 
description of U.S. equity holdings is outdated). 
 178. Id.; see ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 40–75, 110–15 (1968). See generally John C. 
Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in 
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fragmented group of shareholders will each be poorly motivated 
to exercise oversight, leaving managers to extract rents at the 
expense of apathetic investors.179 
Gilson and Gordon point to a new dynamic. Mutual funds 
and other investment funds now represent the major investors 
in public companies.180 As intermediaries for household and cor-
porate savers, asset managers import a more complex interplay 
of conflicts in corporate governance.181 The shareholder-man-
ager conflict is still present.182 In addition, however, Gilson and 
Gordon also highlight tension between mutual fund managers 
and their savers.183 These managers possess limited incentives 
to agitate on behalf of their savers to exercise active governance 
of the companies in which saver-wealth has been invested.184 
At first glance, this dynamic seems counter-intuitive. Asset 
managers—by dint of size and the capital they control–possess 
extraordinary power to agitate for good governance and to re-
duce the agency conflict between shareholders and corporate 
managers.185 Rather than face an uninformed group of apathetic, 
dispersed investors, corporate managers must now contend with 
expert, experienced, and well-resourced institutions that should 
be far less vulnerable to opportunistic rent seeking.186 Im-
portantly, investors like BlackRock and Vanguard possess real 
clout. Even though individual funds within a “fund family” 
might each only own a small portion of the equity in a particular 
company, the exercise of voting rights occurs at the level of the 
fund family as a whole.187 Individual asset managers, like Van-
guard, thus deploy the voting power of all their funds jointly as 
 
the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001) (examining 
the interaction between corporate governance and the quality of capital mar-
kets); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006) 
(providing insights into greater concentration in capital markets and a survey 
of the implications for the Berle-Means model of corporate ownership). 
 179. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 178, at 110–15. 
 180. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 35, at 874. 
 181. See id. at 865 (describing the conflicts arising from the unique role asset 
managers play). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.; see also Morley, supra note 19, at 1232 (discussing the separation 
between funds and managers that might give rise to conflict). 
 185. See Morley, supra note 19, at 1243 (noting the power of managers and 
suggesting positive aspects of that power). 
 186. See id. at 1239 (noting the resources and experience management com-
panies have). 
 187. Elhauge, supra note 36, at 1268. 
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one entity, rather than as a collection of smaller funds, such that 
they all generally vote the same way on governance proposals.188 
Scholars have devoted considerable study to mutual funds 
as investors in public companies. While this literature is too ex-
tensive to be discussed here, a few findings are worth noting. 
First, though the evidence should point to a motivated and effec-
tive group of investors, it is instead mixed and equivocal in its 
conclusions. To some degree, this makes sense. Asset managers 
can agitate for change. But they can also exit their investments. 
The option to cash out and liquidate their holdings in case of dis-
satisfaction offers a ready exit that acts as a brake on active en-
gagement in governance.189 Where interventions might require 
effort, expense, and time, exercising the option to sell one’s 
shares and exit might be a more efficient use of fund re-
sources.190 Agitation is expensive and legally complex. And, 
funds tend to diversify, limiting the gains from any single inter-
vention.191 
 
 188. Azar, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 36, at 34–35; Elhauge, supra 
note 36, at 1268; see also Angela Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Ev-
idence from Mutual Fund Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 914, 920 (2011) (noting that, 
on management-sponsored proposals, individual firms are likely to vote the 
same way within the fund family 97.6% of the time). On shareholder-sponsored 
proposals, there may be greater deviation between funds within the same fam-
ily. See Morgan et al., supra, at 920. The authors find a greater overall diver-
gence in coordination between funds in the same family than other studies. Cf. 
Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evi-
dence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 166 (2007) (noting an 
almost 98% commonality in fund votes between fund families). 
 189. See Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. 
ECON. 31, 31–34 (1993) (noting the option of exit as a check on active governance 
by mutual funds). 
 190. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). Much of the 
work related to exit and voice stems from the seminal work of Albert O. Hirsch-
man. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Share-
holder Activism: Exit as Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2646 (2009) (“If 
a large shareholder is aware that a firm’s management does not act in the best 
interest of shareholders, it may be rational for the shareholder to follow the so-
called ‘Wall Street Rule’ or ‘Wall Street Walk,’ voting with his feet and selling 
his shares, rather than attempting to be active.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity 
Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1277, 1338 (1991) (monitoring by institutions is diminished where high li-
quidity enables exit). But see Pierre Collin-Dufresne & Vyacheslav Fos, Moral 
Hazard, Informed Trading, and Stock Prices 35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 19619, 2014) (suggesting that liquidity enables the 
formation of blocks of shareholders and thus encourages corporate governance 
interventions). 
 191. See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality? 
59 EMORY L.J. 869, 870–71 (2010). For example, some have observed a reliance 
on advisory firms that provide recommendations to institutional shareholders 
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Importantly, the asset management industry’s compensa-
tion model further diminishes motivation on the part of fund 
managers for activism. Fund managers make their money by 
earning management and transaction fees, rather than a cut of 
the profits from investments.192 Because they are paid flatter 
compensation that is also heavily scrutinized and regulated by 
the SEC, managers may be less willing to invest in aggressive 
governance. Managers will be paid their regular fee and will not 
stand to directly earn a slice of any gain that accrues to the in-
vestment.193 Conversely, if investments fail to make money, a 
manger’s reputation might be dented, but she will continue to 
earn her usual fee.194  
Second, mutual funds often offer a low-cost, low-frills ser-
vice, particularly in seeking to capture the capital of retail sav-
ers. Vanguard, for example, specifically markets itself as a man-
ager appealing broadly to cost-conscious actors.195 If this effort 
succeeds, an asset manager increases the dollar volume of assets 
under its management (and the fees it earns as a result).196 Sav-
ers can also gain if they are able to access affordable investment 
vehicles.197 The low-fee model, however, places a constraint on 
 
about how to vote. Id. at 870. Proxy firms like Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices (ISS) advise shareholders on how best to vote on proposals. Id. at 871; 
James Cotter et al., ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy 
Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“We find that mutual funds tend to vote 
in line with ISS recommendations across the board. . . . [M]utual funds vote con-
sistently with ISS recommendations more often than do all shareholders.”). 
 192. Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmffeeshtm.html (last updated Jan. 
15, 2013) (noting that investors in Index Fund A can experience higher returns 
than those at Index Fund B, if Fund A charges lower fees than B). 
 193. Ian R. Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. 
ECON. 111, 113 (2016) (observing that passive fund managers seek to reach a 
performance benchmark but “have little motive to improve an individual stock’s 
performance”). 
 194. See Bhide, supra note 189, at 43 (noting that “[l]osses do not necessarily 
establish managerial incompetence since the alternatives might have been 
worse”). 
 195. Patrick Collinson, Giant US Fund Manager to Shake Up UK Investment 
Market by Halving Fees, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian 
.com/business/2017/may/16/vanguard-funds-investment-isa-uk-fees 
-hargreaves-lansdown-fidelity. 
 196. Landon Thomas, Jr., Vanguard Is Growing Faster than Everybody Else 
Combined, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/ 
business/mutfund/vanguard-mutual-index-funds-growth.html (observing that 
Vanguard’s model has allowed it to grow much more quickly than other mutual 
funds). 
 197. The Benefits of Lower Costs: Why Cost Matters, VANGUARD, https:// 
about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguard-apart/the-benefits-of-lower-costs (last 
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the scope and intensity of the corporate governance efforts that 
managers may be willing to perform. Lengthy activist campaigns 
may be economically unattractive where managers cannot re-
coup the costs of mounting them from their clients.198 For fund 
managers expressly offering a cheap investment product, what 
managers can charge from their fund holders is likely to be 
tightly circumscribed. The appeal of mass-market investment 
products has contributed to the growth of passively managed 
funds, where returns are benchmarked to a particular index (like 
the S&P 500).199 In overseeing passive funds, managers do not 
routinely buy and sell securities to influence the public compa-
nies where they are invested; they only adjust their portfolios at 
regular intervals to reflect the risk and diversity of their chosen 
benchmark.200 Passive funds have proven enormously popular in 
recent years. Between 1998 and 2014, the share of equity mutual 
fund assets held under passive management grew to 33.5%, tri-
pling in the course of less than two decades.201 
As Professors Gilson and Gordon argue, these industry dy-
namics push against mutual fund asset managers adopting an 
active approach to corporate governance.202 Importantly, compe-
tition between top asset managers is unlikely to bridge this mo-
tivation gap. If multiple asset managers—like BlackRock, Fidel-
ity, and Vanguard—control funds invested in the same company, 
then activism by one manager will lead to gains for the other 
managers too.203 Also, the activist manager will have to charge 
its own savers higher fees to reflect the transaction costs of agi-
tation.204 This means that the active manager loses against its 
competitors on two fronts: (1) its efforts create returns for its 
competition as well as for itself; and (2) its returns to savers are 
lower because it must charge them higher fees for action.205 Un-
 
visited Oct. 22, 2018). Vanguard is perhaps most famous for its adherence to a 
low-cost model of money management. See id. 
 198. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 35, at 902–03 (noting that activists 
incur costs and that gains have to be shared with other shareholders). 
 199. Id. at 885–86 (describing low-cost index investing). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Appel et al., supra note 193, at 112. 
 202. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 35, 889–95 (discussing various dynam-
ics that influence mutual fund managers to adopt passive approaches). 
 203. See id. at 902–03 (noting that there are costs associated with activism 
and that gains have to be shared with other shareholders). 
 204. See id. at 892 (observing that the costs incurred by taking on an activist 
role will “reduce the fund’s returns”). 
 205. Id. 
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surprisingly, then, studies suggest that mutual funds have gen-
erally played a backseat role in governance, reflecting a kind of 
strategic, rational passivity.206 For example, according to one 
2016 industry study on executive compensation, BlackRock sup-
ported pay practices 96.3% of the time at its S&P 500 firms.207 
This picture, however, may be more nuanced.208 One study 
pointed to the important role of “voice” in corporate govern-
ance.209 Rather than perform public acts of activism—such as 
voting and visible agitation—asset managers may instead en-
gage in backstage interventions.210 Rather than make displays 
of their activity, funds may use their power and knowledge to 
make changes through private engagement with manage-
ment.211 In his 2017 annual letter to corporate CEOs, 
BlackRock’s Larry Fink outlined his aim to use the firm’s influ-
ence to promote better governance and long-term value crea-
tion.212 And scholars have also argued that passive managers 
may still influence corporate management despite their low-cost, 
passive approach. For example, because they invest for the long 
term and do not exercise the option to exit (by selling), managers 
at passive funds actually have a strong incentive to push for good 
corporate governance outcomes.213 One study further observes 
that passively managed funds can, in fact, produce results for 
 
 206. Cotter et al., supra note 191, 8–12 (noting that higher legal compliance 
costs as well as more cynical incentives to curry favor with employer-based 
thrift plans may have motivated the historically passive governance role played 
by mutual funds). 
 207. Alexandra Stevenson & Leslie Picker, A Rare Corner of Finance Where 
Women Dominate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
01/16/business/dealbook/women-corporate-governance-shareholders.html. 
However, BlackRock also reported that it had voted against pay packages at ten 
out of fifty companies where companies reported the highest pay. Id. 
 208. Morgan et al., supra note 188, at 927 (noting a significant divergence 
across funds “with respect to voting on shareholder proposals”). 
 209. Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Govern-
ance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2911 (2016). 
 210. Id. at 2907. 
 211. Id. at 2911. 
 212. Fink, supra note 37. 
 213. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate 
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 833 (1993) (noting that being 
locked into an index may lead passive managers to place a greater emphasis on 
activism). But see Jill E. Fisch et al., Passive Investors, (June 29, 2018) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with Minnesota Law Review) (analyzing the in-
centives of passive index funds to exercise good governance, and noting, for ex-
ample, the ability of fund holders to sell and exit as a factor motivating 
managers to diligently oversee investments).  
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corporate governance, with their interventions influencing ben-
efits like increased board independence.214 
Nevertheless, historical practices have largely pointed to 
fund managers being more passive in their corporate governance 
than their size and clout would suggest. Gilson and Gordon’s ar-
gument provides a compelling explanation as to why this might 
be the case. Fund managers lack sufficient skin in the game to 
behave in the manner of engaged, activist investors.215 They thus 
benefit when more aggressive investors like hedge funds take a 
lead in surveillance and agitation.216 
3. Asset Managers in the Banking Industry 
BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, T. Rowe Price, and Van-
guard have emerged as important equity investors in banking.217 
These asset managers have utilized the fund capital under their 
charge to deeply invest in the equity of large U.S. bank holding 
companies.218 
It makes sense that asset managers should flex their eco-
nomic power in the banking industry. Controlling trillions of dol-
lars’ worth of assets, asset managers invest widely across the 
spectrum of American public companies. This is evident in the 
case of BlackRock—the largest asset manager in the world.219 
Founded in 1988, the firm has expanded rapidly to hold a signif-
icant place in everyday economic life. In 2015, BlackRock re-
ported managing assets worth over $4.6 trillion,220 up from $3.5 
trillion in 2011.221 BlackRock invests in equity-based invest-
ments around the world as well as in fixed-income (debt) securi-
ties, like bonds, as well as commodities, real property, and in-
vestment funds.222 
 
 214. Appel et al., supra note 193. 
 215. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 35, at 876–77. 
 216. Id. at 866–67. 
 217. See Elhauge, supra note 36, at 1268 (noting that, in 2013–14, JPMorgan 
Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup were all heavily invested in by major 
mutual funds). 
 218. Id. 
 219. The Monolith and the Markets, supra note 18, at 25. 
 220. BLACKROCK, BUILT FOR CHANGE: 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 3 (2016) 
[hereinafter BLACKROCK, 2015 REPORT] (showing that the growth in the value 
of assets under management can be ascribed to inflows of new assets, growth in 
the value of securities already held, as well as, inter alia, acquisitions). 
 221. BLACKROCK, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, 11 (2012) [hereinafter 
BLACKROCK, 2011 REPORT]. 
 222. BLACKROCK, 2015 REPORT, supra note 220, at 2–3; see also The Mono-
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While smaller than BlackRock, asset managers like Fidel-
ity, Vanguard, State Street Global, and T. Rowe Price also con-
trol trillions of dollars’ worth of capital. Vanguard, the second-
largest U.S. asset manager after BlackRock, administered just 
over $5.1 trillion in assets under management (AUM) as of Jan-
uary 31, 2018.223 State Street Global Advisors oversaw around 
$2.8 trillion in AUM at the year-end of 2017;224 Fidelity held $2.5 
trillion in AUM as of March 31, 2018;225 and T. Rowe Price held 
$1.07 trillion in AUM as of July 31, 2018.226 
This cohort of asset managers provides capital to public com-
panies on behalf of household and corporate savers. BlackRock, 
in particular, appears to be a ubiquitous investor, reportedly 
holding a stake in almost every single U.S. publicly-traded com-
pany.227 As Professor Einer Elhauge notes, BlackRock, Fidelity, 
State Street, and Vanguard together hold 80% of all stock in S&P 
500 corporations.228 
It is unsurprising that the largest asset managers—custodi-
ans of the deepest pools of capital anywhere—should also invest 
heavily in banking. For one, they invest across industries, creat-
ing a diverse portfolio of securities in their fund families.229 In-
deed, if asset managers offer funds that simply track an index, 
like the S&P 500, then large, publicly traded banking firms can-
not easily be left out of the portfolio. And if finance is profit-gen-
erating, a failing by fund managers to take advantage might be 
seen as breaking a promise to clients to choose lucrative 
stocks.230  
The results of U.S. bank holding ownership data from proxy 
statements for the years 2011 and 2017 point to an increasing 
 
lith and the Markets, supra note 18, at 25 (“Though its holdings are mostly eq-
uities . . . it also holds bonds, commodities, hedge funds, property and just about 
anything anyone would ever want to invest in . . . .”). 
 223. Fast Facts About Vanguard, supra note 20. 
 224. STATE ST., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS (2018). 
 225. About Fidelity, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/ 
overview (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 226. What We Do, T. ROWE PRICE, https://www3.troweprice.com/usis/ 
corporate/en/what-we-do.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 227. The Rise of BlackRock, supra note 18, at 13. 
 228. Elhauge, supra note 36, at 1277. See David Gilo, The Anticompetitive 
Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2000), for an early discussion 
of the anticompetitive costs of passive investors across leading companies. 
 229. See Elhauge, supra note 36, at 1268 (discussing the wide variety of in-
dustries major mutual funds are invested in). 
 230. See id. at 1274 (discussing the ways in which managers attempt to ap-
peal to their shareholders’ interests). 
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number of blockholders in bank capital structures.231 Further, it 
shows that these block stakes are concentrated in the hands of a 
few major asset managers: BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street 
Global Advisors, Fidelity, and T. Rowe Price.232 In 2017, for the 
twenty-six publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies subject 
to the Federal Reserve’s 2017 stress-test, twenty-five out of the 
twenty-six firms included both BlackRock and Vanguard as own-
ers of more than 5% of common stock. State Street Global fea-
tured as a blockholder in twelve firms, Fidelity in six firms, and 
T. Rowe Price in five holding companies. In all, BlackRock and 
Vanguard constituted the most prolific large shareholders, fea-
turing in twenty-five of the twenty-six banks studied (though not 
always in the same banks). 
Contrast these ownership patters with those seen in the 
2011 proxy statements. Surveying twenty-four firms in the proxy 
statements of 2011,233 only ten bank holding companies listed 
BlackRock as a blockholder, seven included Fidelity, and State 
Street and Vanguard each appeared as blockholders in only one 
bank.234 In 2011, several leading bank holding companies, such 
as Bank of America or PNC Financial, reported having no large 
blockholders at all. 
The reasons driving this increase in the higher equity hold-
ings of asset management firms in bank holding companies in 
2017 are complex and merit separate empirical study. I do not 
make any claim here as to a particular explanatory or causal ac-
count regarding this trend. 
Still, these five big asset managers—and the funds they rep-
resent—now clearly constitute critical providers of equity capital 
to the largest, most complex U.S. banks. More importantly, as 
blockholders at multiple bank holding companies, they each also 
possess voting and governance power to exercise control of these 
critically important financial firms. 
 
 231. See infra Charts A, B, and C. 
 232. See infra Charts A, B, and C. 
 233. Neither Citizens Financial Group nor CIT Group were included in the 
2011 stress-test, while both were included in the 2017 stress-test. Citizens Fi-
nancial was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Scotland (UK) until 
2015. Dexheimer, supra note 15. CIT Group was undergoing bankruptcy in 
2009. Touryalai, supra note 15. CIT Group reemerged as an FDIC-insured bank 
holding company in late 2011. Id.  
 234. See infra Chart B. 
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B. BANK EQUITY SUPPLIERS: SURVEY RESULTS 
These charts set out the percentage ownership interests of 
shareholders with over 5% of equity in publicly traded U.S. bank 
holding companies subject to the Federal Reserve’s mandatory 
stress tests for large and complex banks. The information here 
is taken from the banks’ proxy statements for years 2017 and 
2011. For simplicity, I include information on the five asset man-
agers that appear as blockholders for five or more bank holding 
companies. Numerous asset managers also hold block stakes in 
U.S. banks but at fewer than five holding companies. Their own-
ership details are not included here. 
 
Chart A - Ownership Chart 2017 Proxy Statements235 
 
 
  
 
 235. This Chart shows the results of my analysis of U.S. bank holding own-
ership data taken from each bank’s 2017 proxy statement. The background data 
is on file with the author.  
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Chart B - Ownership Chart 2011 Proxy Statements236 
 
 
 
Chart C – Approx. Average % Ownership 2017 Proxy Statements237 
 
 
 
 236. This Chart shows the results of my analysis of U.S. bank holding own-
ership data taken from each bank’s 2011 proxy statement. The background data 
is on file with the author. 
 237. This Chart shows the results of my analysis of U.S. bank holding own-
ership data taken from each bank’s 2017 proxy statement. The background data 
is on file with the author. 
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III.  TOO BIG TO FAIL SHAREHOLDERS   
As shown in Parts I and II, post-Crisis capital regulation 
places special emphasis on ensuring that bank holding compa-
nies fund themselves more fully through equity. In the years 
since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the real-world compo-
sition of these capital buffers shows two major trends: (1) an in-
creasing number of blockholders at the largest U.S. banks; and 
(2) the preeminence of a small group of shareholders as block-
holders across multiple major firms in the banking system. With 
equity key to shoring up the safety and soundness of large banks 
post-Crisis, these asset managers have come to occupy a partic-
ularly important place on the front lines of financial risk man-
agement.  
In turn, public policy also depends on the ability of fund 
managers to protect their savers from the consequences of risk-
taking at the banks where their funds invest. If a bank fails, its 
shareholders will shoulder the cost.238 And because banks can 
often collapse contagiously, potentially afflicting multiple firms, 
these losses, too, can multiply.239 Unlike other types of compa-
nies, where the fall of a big name spells good news for its com-
petitors, the collapse of a large bank is likely to trigger fears of a 
much greater, system-wide failure.240 For asset managers in-
vested across multiple competing banking firms, then, the de-
mise of one may well portend trouble at others. Even if authori-
ties do not formally trigger wind down processes by mandating 
that the value of equity be wiped out to pay off creditors, just the 
prospect of such an event is likely to depress bank share prices 
and, as a result, the value of asset managers’ fund portfolios.241 
This Part examines how effectively asset managers might 
perform their role as overseers of risk at the banks where their 
funds are invested. Because they legally represent their funds at 
numerous large banks at once, the financial system is systemi-
cally impacted by the incentives, skills, and shortcomings of as-
 
 238. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 71, at 403 (noting that during bank 
runs, banks are forced to liquidate all of their assets, often at a loss). 
 239. RICKS, supra note 4, at 5; Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 71, at 401. 
 240. See RICKS, supra note 4, at 110–11 (arguing that an initial shock to the 
banking system can trigger a larger panic). 
 241. See, e.g., Eric Dash & Louise Story, Citigroup Tries to Stop the Drop in 
Its Share Price, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/ 
21/business/21finance.html (discussing how uncertainty about the future 
caused share prices of banks to continue to fall during the 2008 Financial Cri-
sis). 
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set managers in exercising this governance power. This Part ar-
gues that asset managers possess unique advantages, bringing 
a less risk-seeking model of equity investment to bank govern-
ance.  
A. THE CHALLENGE OF SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE IN 
BANKING  
Corporate governance matters in financial regulation.242 
But, exercising this governance faces unique and costly chal-
lenges. As Professors Armour and Gordon observe, banks pre-
sent a more unique governance proposition than other types of 
companies.243 For a start, giving shareholder interests overall 
primacy, as is conventional in corporate law, sits uneasily with 
public policy.244 With banks supported by an explicit public 
safety net, pursuing shareholder interests at the expense of all 
else can result in costly consequences for the public purse.245 Be-
yond just creating a different set of trade-offs for shareholders, 
banks are also notoriously tricky to understand from the stand-
point of how they are run, the risks they assume, and how these 
 
 242. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bond-
holder Financed, Systematically Risky World, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 
1356–63 (2017) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governance] (ar-
guing for a greater duty to bondholders in financial institutions); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibil-
ity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 787–96 (2017) (advocating for more internal regula-
tion of risk-taking); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Corporate Governance in 
the Public Interest: The Case of Systemic Risk, Keynote Address at the National 
Business Law Scholars Conference (June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Pub-
lic Interest] (arguing that corporate governance laws should require some duty 
to the public); see also David Min, Realigning Bank Governance 27–29 (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing literature investigating 
the importance of corporate governance). 
 243. Armour & Gordon, supra note 23, at 76; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 274–78 (2010) 
(discussing some of the considerations in corporate governance); Bruner, supra 
note 23 (analyzing the significance of corporate governance as a key factor gov-
erning financial system risk); Robert Hockett, Are Bank Fiduciaries Special?, 
68 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1108–15 (2017) (noting the challenge of applying tradi-
tional corporate law paradigms to banking regulation); Saule T. Omarova, Bank 
Governance and Systemic Stability: The “Golden Share” Approach, 68 ALA. L. 
REV. 1029, 1031–32 (2017) (noting the significance of executive pay in banking 
stability and suggesting that a government representative sit on bank boards 
to represent the public interest); cf. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 52, at 1236–
51 (discussing creditor governance). 
 244. Omarova, supra note 243, at 1031–32. 
 245. See id. (noting that the Crisis was an example of how “socially destruc-
tive” it can be when bank managers only pursue “short-term private gains”). 
  
638 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:587 
 
risks should be priced.246 To appreciate the default risks faced by 
shareholders, banks represent a daunting informational chal-
lenge, necessitating deep pockets and expertise to overcome, if it 
can, in fact, be fully overcome at all.247 
1. The High Costs of Bank Corporate Governance  
The costs of corporate governance tend to be especially high 
for financial institutions. With asset managers charged with cor-
porate governance at multiple large banks, these costs grow in 
lockstep. As Professors Mehran and Mollineaux observe, under-
standing the measure of these costs must begin with a more fun-
damental inquiry about what it means to govern a large and 
complex financial institution: namely, what does a well-governed 
financial firm look like?248 As Armour et al. note, banks cannot 
simply prioritize shareholder profits.249 To do so would cause 
bank managers to place an unduly high premium on risk-taking 
and on maximizing returns for shareholders at the expense of 
market stability.250 As made clear by the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
the price tag for such risk-taking can run into the trillions of dol-
lars, not to mention cause long-term economic damage.251  
At the same time, financial conglomerates like JPMorgan 
Chase or Citigroup now perform a multiplicity of functions be-
yond just taking deposits and lending. These all require the bank 
to take risks, to varying degrees.252 Large banks extend credit, 
underwrite securities offerings, facilitate trading in these secu-
rities as well provide critical financial infrastructure (e.g., for 
making payments).253 In seeking to formulate their approaches 
 
 246. Choi et al., supra note 191, at 870–79 (discussing risk metrics, investor 
influence, and shareholder activism); Cotter et al., supra note 191, at 6–12 (dis-
cussing risk metrics). 
 247. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 248. HAMID MEHRAN & LINDSAY MOLLINEAUX, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
STAFF REPORT NO. 539, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
6–11 (2012). 
 249. JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 372–75 
(2016) (discussing the unique features of bank shareholders relative to those at 
other companies). 
 250. See id. at 374 (noting that increased risk may result in more gains for 
shareholders, but also cautioning that a “bank failure can trigger contagion in 
other parts of the financial system”). 
 251. MEHRAN & MOLLINEAUX, supra note 248, at 11–14. 
 252. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 249, at 433–34 (discussing the ways in 
which banks have changed and the ways in which new risks have arisen). 
 253. See Levitin, supra note 61, at 411–13, for an explanation of “narrow 
banking.” See also Morgan P. Ricks, Safety First? The Deceptive Allure of Full 
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towards corporate governance, asset managers must first decide 
how much risk a bank should take.254 While lawmakers have 
called for an end to “too big to fail” banks and taxpayer funded 
bailouts, these fuzzily-formulated bounds leave plenty of room 
for debate and disagreement about what a good bank should look 
like.255  
With these uncertainties about outcomes in bank govern-
ance, shareholders will likely have competing views about how 
to resolve the tension between a bank’s profit-seeking role and 
its public function. Divergences in perspective between institu-
tional shareholders can contribute to higher decision costs, re-
flecting the challenges of shareholders coordinating with each 
other and in deciding on and taking action.256 In turn, these high 
decision costs can reduce the motivation of even interested in-
vestors to engage in governance.257 At the very least, they set a 
threshold at which shareholders will be willing to intervene: 
shareholders move only when the gains offset the transaction 
costs involved in any action.258 Where these costs are high to 
 
Reserve Banking, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 118–19 (2016) (noting the challenges 
for narrow banking with fiscal management and monetary policy). 
 254. See MEHRAN & MOLLINEAUX, supra note 248, at 11 (discussing the 
many executives that influence major decisions, including determining risk pro-
files). 
 255. See, e.g., Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall 
-street-reform (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (discussing Wall Street Reform, steps 
taken to hold banks accountable, and the policy aversion to future bailouts). On 
the controversies surrounding optimal riskiness at banks, to cite just one exam-
ple, there remains considerable debate about whether and to what extent banks 
ought to invest in the commodity markets, to buy and sell oil or metals. While 
lucrative, it may result in banks facing large liabilities in case of a natural dis-
aster, or a crash in the price of a commodity. See Donna Borak & Liz Hoffman, 
Fed Targets Big Bank Commodity Lines, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2016), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/fed-proposes-limits-on-bank-commodity-trading 
-1474646400 (discussing policy proposals to reduce bank involvement in com-
modity markets); see also Neel Kashkari, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis, Lessons from the Crisis: Ending Too Big to Fail, Remarks at the 
Brookings Institution (Feb. 16, 2016) (advocating for a greater focus on breaking 
up large banks); Ben S. Bernanke, Ending “Too Big to Fail”: What’s the Right 
Approach?, BROOKINGS (May 13, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ 
ben-bernanke/2016/05/13/ending-too-big-to-fail-whats-the-right-approach (dis-
cussing policy proposals for ending “too big to fail” financial institutions).  
 256. See McCahery, supra note 209, at 2921 (noting that investors may have 
conflicts of interest and may be wary of potential legal risks that could result 
from coordinating with each other). 
 257. See id. at 2922 (noting that there are many potential impediments to 
investors engaging in governance). 
 258. See id. at 2921 (observing that investors want to avoid free riders and 
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start with—as in bank regulation—shareholders may be more 
likely to be rationally apathetic.259  
Indeed, institutional shareholders—like mutual funds—
routinely disagree with one another (and, occasionally, within 
the fund families themselves) in everyday, nonbanking con-
texts.260 In one study of twenty-four of the largest mutual funds, 
the authors found agreement among them on certain issues, but 
divergence on others. While large funds agreed on themes like 
opposition to antitakeover strategies, variation existed on other 
topics such as compensation and the degree of deference to be 
accorded to management.261 These usual corporate law problems 
inevitably affect how banks operate as they do other types of 
companies.  
However, overlaid on these general disagreements are con-
siderations about how bank operations impact the riskiness of 
the firm, its likelihood of needing to access the public safety net, 
and its threat to financial stability.262 The issue of executive com-
pensation for bankers, for instance, exemplifies an area where 
corporate governance and financial riskiness intersect. Follow-
ing the Crisis, policymakers blamed lucrative pay packets and 
generous performance bonuses as a contributing cause of the col-
lapse.263 Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, shareholders must 
now examine the merits of compensation packages from the 
usual corporate law lens as to whether or not such pay reflects 
 
that activism only makes sense when the activist receives benefits much larger 
than their costs). 
 259. See id. at 2922 (noting that shareholders require incentives in order to 
be active and that, when the incentives aren’t there, shareholders are not moti-
vated to engage). 
 260. See Morgan et al., supra note 188, for an explanation of disagreements 
between fund families. 
 261. Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: 
New Evidence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 176–78 
(2006). This paper also noted a large amount of consensus within fund families 
that tended to vote their proxies as a block. Id. at 167. However, it also noted 
variations between funds with regards to deference to management. Id. at 178–
79. In this study, for example, the authors noted that the five largest funds 
tended to vote against management 17% of the time on average—the highest 
being Vanguard (29%) and the lowest being T. Rowe Price (8%). Id. at 167. See 
Morgan et al., supra note 188, for a literature review discussing the practices of 
mutual fund voting patterns. 
 262. See MEHRAN & MOLLINEAUX, supra note 248, at 3 (“As market moni-
toring decreases, it becomes more likely that banks can increase their systemic 
risk unnoticed, which can lead to greater instability of the financial system.”). 
 263. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INCENTIVE COMPENSA-
TION PRACTICES: A REPORT ON THE HORIZONTAL REVIEW OF PRACTICES AT 
LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 13–15 (2011). 
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an executive’s contribution to corporate growth. But, for banks, 
this scrutiny also includes deliberation about how any pay 
packet affects the bank’s behavior as a risk-agent in the mar-
ket.264 Ultimately, this kind of inquiry distills down to complex 
and contentious questions about what banks can and should do 
and how much risk they can safely take. Given that these funda-
mental inquiries remain unanswered and subject to different 
views between investors, decision costs for bank corporate gov-
ernance set a high threshold for action.265  
Indeed, the costs’ impact may be especially heavily felt by 
asset managers. As holders of block stakes across numerous fi-
nancial firms, asset managers have to reconcile conflicts along 
two axes: (1) as blockholders, an asset manager might have sev-
eral funds within its fund family invested at a large bank.266 
These individual funds might have varying investment objec-
tives (e.g., one may be passively indexed while another is actively 
managed) and disagreements about bank function may arise out 
of these divergences;267 and (2) blockholders may reasonably dis-
agree with one another. Holding large economic stakes at large 
banks, a difference of views among expert investors is likely, if 
not to be expected.268 
Information Costs: Information costs also heavily impact 
bank corporate governance. Large financial institutions present 
especially steep knowledge gaps for shareholders. First, share-
holders must wrestle with informational complexity embedded 
 
 264. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 243, at 271–72 (noting the 
link between high pay at banks and risk-taking in the 2008 financial crisis); 
Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater 
Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance? 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 
1218–22 (2012) (discussing the implications of the Dodd-Frank Act’s “say-on-
pay” proposals for shareholder’s input into executive compensation packages at 
banking institutions). 
 265. See, for example, Hockett, supra note 243, at 1085–86, and Omarova, 
supra note 243, at 1031, for a discussion by both authors of the difficulties in-
terpreting the term “systemic risk” for the purposes of bank regulation. 
 266. See Elhauge, supra note 36, at 1268. Many of the top mutual funds own 
significant percentages of major banks. Id. As such, it is extremely likely that 
they would have multiple funds within their fund families invested at the same 
bank. 
 267. See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 84, at 292–93 (explaining that man-
agers have to balance other objectives outside of simply “furthering the interests 
of the owners”); Morgan et al., supra note 188, at 915 (noting that “funds do not 
always vote consistently within fund families”). 
 268. See Morgan et al., supra note 188, at 927 (noting that some divergence 
arises from the type of fund and from the subadvisor). 
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within the organizational structure of financial institutions.269 
That large and complex firms defy a clear understanding of their 
activities and firm structure has become something of a truism 
after the Crisis.270 Organizationally, major financial holding 
companies comprise sprawling networks of domestic and inter-
national subsidiaries, affiliates, and branches.271 When Lehman 
failed in 2008, its collapse implicated 209 subsidiaries in twenty-
one countries that were party to 900,000 derivatives contracts 
and subject to $1.2 trillion in creditor claims.272 Regulatory ef-
forts post-2008 have sought to simplify organizational struc-
tures. For example, large banks must now provide regulators 
with a self-styled living will, designed to provide a roadmap 
through a simulated bankruptcy.273 Such measures appear to 
have had some effect in reducing the tangle of entities and eco-
nomic relationships characteristic of large banks before the Cri-
sis.274 For example, Bank of America—the third largest U.S. 
bank, as measured by asset size—notes seventeen material en-
tities in its will.275  
 
 269. See MEHRAN & MOLLINEAUX, supra note 248, at 1–3 (noting that many 
organizational and fundamental aspects of the governance of financial institu-
tions are not easily understood). 
 270. Id. at 3–5. 
 271. See, e.g., Michael J. Fleming & Asani Sarkar, The Failure Resolution of 
Lehman Brothers, 20 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 175, 176 (2014). 
 272. Id. at 175–76. 
 273. Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm (last up-
dated Mar. 1, 2018). 
 274. Compare Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Large Commercial Banks, 
BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ 
lbr/20061231/default.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2007), with Federal Reserve Sta-
tistical Release: Large Commercial Banks, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/20180331/default.htm (last up-
dated June 22, 2018) [hereinafter Statistical Release 2018]. 
 275. BANK OF AM., BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION 2017 RESOLUTION PLAN 
SUBMISSION: PUBLIC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2017); see also 12 C.F.R. § 381.2(l) 
(2011) (“Material entity means a subsidiary or foreign office of the covered com-
pany that is significant to the activities of a critical operation or core busi-
ness . . . .”). The definition of material entities for the living wills resolution pro-
vision is narrower and may not have applied to the 209 subsidiaries that were 
subject to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008. In other words, today’s 
banks may have a greater number of subsidiaries whose operations are not con-
sidered sufficiently material to be included within the resolution plan. But the 
problem is far from fixed. For example, regulators identified deficiencies in the 
living wills of five leading banks in April 2016, suggesting that concerns about 
complexity remained live. Ryan Tracy, Regulators Reject ‘‘Living Wills’’ of Five 
Big U.S. Banks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
regulators-reject-living-wills-of-five-huge-u-s-banks-1460548801. 
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But organizational complexity is just one source of the infor-
mational deficits faced by asset managers as bank sharehold-
ers.276 Gaining insight into bank activities, business lines, and 
assets still represents a challenge despite efforts to simplify cor-
porate structures.277 Importantly, even with a more intensive 
regulatory regime following the Dodd-Frank Act, the largest 
banks in the United States have grown steadily in size, as meas-
ured by the value of their assets. Together, Bank of America, 
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo 
held around $8.6 trillion in assets in 2011, equivalent then to 
56% of the U.S. economy and up by 43% from 2008.278 In 2016, 
this figure had risen to approximately $9 trillion, slowing since 
2011, but nevertheless pointing to bank balance sheets of enor-
mous economic heft and complexity.279  
 
 
 276. FED. RESERVE BD. & FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (FDIC), RESOLUTION 
PLAN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND FIRM DETERMINATIONS (2016) at 5 (2016) 
(noting that firm structure is just one of several areas that banking institutions 
must now address in their resolution plans). 
 277. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1620 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1851 
(2012)). The Volcker Rule was designed to reduce proprietary trading by banks 
as well as to limit direct bank sponsoring of hedge funds. See Whitehead, supra 
note 54, at 47–53, for a discussion of the Volcker Rule and the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 278. David J. Lynch, Big Banks: Now Even Too Bigger to Fail, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-19/big 
-banks-now-even-too-bigger-to-fail. 
 279. The figures for 2016 were taken from the living wills submitted by these 
five biggest banks to regulators as part of their compliance obligations under 
the Dodd-Frank Act. 
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Chart D – Total Assets Commercial Banks280 
 
The activity and asset compositions of the largest U.S. 
banks pose serious hurdles for shareholders seeking to under-
stand how much risk financial firms are assuming as a precursor 
to governance. To understand a bank’s default risk, the compo-
sition of its assets and liabilities, as well the overall viability of 
its business, shareholders must invariably invest considerable 
time, research, and expertise.281 Such a task entails examining 
a bank’s opaque, generally illiquid bank loans, its underwriting 
and trading activities, as well as its international operations.282 
Large bank oversight thus requires monitors to access detailed 
information about the bank’s activities and worldwide opera-
tions.283  
This is not to suggest that institutional investors are bound 
to fail at this task. In one early study, for example, Professors 
 
 280. Fed. Reserve Econ. Data (FRED), Total Assets, All Commercial 
Banks, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ 
TLAACBW027SBOG (last updated Oct. 19, 2018). 
 281. See MEHRAN & MOLLINEAUX, supra note 248, at 21 (discussing the va-
riety of ways in which information about banks can be interpreted and distorted, 
and noting that, even with copious amounts of information, financial institu-
tions can still remain “opaque”). 
 282. See id. 
 283. See, e.g., Financial Stability Oversight Council: Designations, U.S. 
DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last updated Sept. 12, 2018) (noting the Financial Stability Over-
sight Committee’s duties in ensuring financial stability). 
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Flannery and Houston noted that investors were able to price 
equity securities of a banking firm about as well as they did for 
a nonbanking one.284 But the difficulties of valuing opaque and 
often illiquid assets like loans make studying banks and their 
riskiness difficult and costly.285 In another pre-Crisis study on 
the ease of measuring default risk, the author noted that ratings 
by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s differed most from each 
other when examining banks and insurers.286 The higher the 
proportion of a bank’s assets that were focused on loans, the 
more these ratings diverged.287 In other words, ratings agencies 
struggled to arrive at a consistent interpretation of bank riski-
ness, particularly for larger banks holding more loans on their 
balance sheets.288 These differences of opinion suggest that un-
derstanding complex bank balance sheets is far from easy. And 
as made clear during the Crisis, valuing credit risk can be tricky 
to get right when financial engineering enables such risk to be 
sliced, diced, and traded between financial firms.289  
Second, acquiring information is a challenge in matters con-
cerning bank safety and soundness.290 In contrast to securities 
regulation, where disclosure and transparency are emphasized, 
banking has traditionally—and for good reason—favored a more 
discrete approach.291 To help investors seeking out information 
on public companies, securities rules establish a detailed regime 
for ensuring that markets receive a regular flow of materially 
important information.292 With companies required to reveal 
 
 284. Mark J. Flannery & Joel F. Houston, The Value of a Government Mon-
itor for U.S. Banking Firms, 31 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 24–25 (1999). 
 285. DONALD MORGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 
9805, JUDGING THE RISKS OF BANKS: WHAT MAKES BANKS OPAQUE? 19–20 
(1997). 
 286. Id. at 10. 
 287. Id. at 3. 
 288. Id. at 13–14. 
 289. See, e.g., ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 318, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUB-
PRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 9 (2008) (noting that asset managers and investors 
are able to trade). 
 290. MEHRAN & MOLLINEAUX, supra note 248, at 5. 
 291. See id. at 28 (noting that voluntary disclosures could harm banks by 
prompting greater scrutiny). 
 292. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for A Man-
datory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 720–35 (1984); Merritt B. Fox et 
al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 339–41 (2003); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomov-
sky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Infor-
mation, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1263–64 (2001); see also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient 
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deep troves of detailed, internal information, investors do not 
have to pay the costs of research or of negotiating access to cor-
porate data.293 Because of this mechanism, investors freely re-
ceive a regular flow of financial statements, audited accounts, a 
narrative on management, corporate structure, risk factors, and 
prospective plans.294  
Banks are different. If holding companies are publicly 
traded, they must supply corporate data to the market in accord-
ance with securities rules and be subject to the market discipline 
that this disclosure implies.295 However, banks also face the per-
ennial risk that any sort of bad news might push depositors and 
short-term creditors to withdraw their funds, triggering bank 
runs, panic, and contagion.296 This danger means that regulators 
often hold back key bank data from the public domain.297 Partic-
ularly when information develops out of bank supervisory as-
sessments like stress tests, its dissemination can trigger the very 
crisis that regulators are working to avert.298 While this ap-
proach is gradually changing—with more information being 
made available by regulators (e.g., some stress test results)—
public policy has traditionally dictated that fuller data about the 
inner health of banks be kept deliberately veiled.299  
This secrecy heightens information costs and dampens the 
incentives of institutions to exercise active governance.300 Where 
acquiring knowledge on the workings of banks is expensive, in-
vestors will wish to assure that their payoff is greater than what 
 
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) 
(arguing, in what has become the seminal article on the topic, that information 
available to the market is captured in market prices as part of an efficient mar-
ket). 
 293. See Coffee, supra note 292, at 724 (noting that there is improved effi-
ciency when investors do not have to gather information on their own). 
 294. See Form 10-K, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/ 
fast-answers/answers-form10khtm.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (explaining 
U.S. public companies must disclose specific information on an ongoing basis). 
 295. Id. 
 296. MEHRAN & MOLLINEAUX, supra note 248, at 9. 
 297. See id. at 21 (noting that there have been concerns that the disclosure 
of data regarding the health of the banking industry could trigger bank runs). 
 298. See id. (noting that stress-tests and other measures of bank health can 
have implications for the entire sector and that disclosure of results could in-
crease worries). 
 299. See id. (discussing “the importance of information in addressing the 
public’s desire for banks to be safe yet innovative”). 
 300. See McCahery, supra note 209, at 2922 (noting that shareholders re-
quire incentives in order to be active and that, when the incentives are not 
there, shareholders are not motivated to engage). 
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they invest.301 Investors will also need to spend money on exe-
cuting intervention strategies, further raising the threshold at 
which they take action.302 Arguably, asset managers will have 
limited appetite to deal with such costs. Where fund managers 
wish to keep overall transactions costs down, investing in re-
source intensive research and analysis is likely to appear unde-
sirable. 
Particularly for larger, more complex banks that are pre-
senting a mix of decision, implementation, and information 
costs, rational apathy presents an efficient course of action even 
for well-resourced investors. 
2. Regulatory Costs and Rational Passivity 
In addition to costs, the design of bank regulation creates 
incentives for shareholders to refrain from performing govern-
ance. This regulatory framework hardens the rational apathy of 
asset managers towards corporate governance.303  
To stave off the threat of a bank run and to prevent conta-
gion from spreading into the economy, banks benefit from a num-
ber of support mechanisms: (1) deposit insurance, (2) emergency 
credit from the Federal Reserve and potential implicit guaran-
tees of assistance, and (3) extensive oversight at the state and 
federal level. While such assistance can come at high taxpayer 
expense, its gains are evidenced by the assurance of a safer fi-
nancial system.304  
Guarantees of state support, however, can distort the incen-
tives of shareholders to be diligent in how they oversee a complex 
bank.305 For a start, banks are overseen by a multiplicity of pub-
lic regulators, tasked with ensuring their safety and soundness. 
Additionally, banks are supported by deposit insurance, access 
to the Federal Reserve discount window, and possible bailout as-
sistance in the event that a bank is too big to fail. With the tax-
payer investing heavily in bank surveillance, it makes little 
 
 301. See id. at 2921 (observing that investors want to avoid free riders and 
that activism only makes sense when the activist receives benefits much larger 
than their costs). 
 302. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 35, at 902–03 (noting that activists 
incur costs). 
 303. See id. at 864 (arguing “against recent proposed regulatory changes 
that would undercut shareholder activists’ economic incentives by making it 
harder to assemble a meaningful toehold position in a potential target”). 
 304. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 305. MICHAEL BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 239–
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sense for shareholders to invest in further monitoring and inter-
vention. With shareholders holding only incomplete reserves of 
information on these opaque and complex institutions, with de-
cision-costs attached to action, it makes sense for shareholders 
to just rely on public oversight as a cheaper and possibly more 
effective approach to bank supervision.  
In other words, express and implicit state support through 
deposit insurance, emergency credit, as well as an extensive su-
pervisory apparatus can further limit the interest of investors to 
govern diligently. With corporate governance decisions also sub-
ject to health-checks by regulators, the scope of investor action 
is further curtailed by the need to secure regulatory sign-off. 
Ideas about mergers, remaking corporate structure (e.g., 
through sell-offs of bank units), or suggestions for future busi-
ness (e.g., engaging in commodities trading) will be subject to 
scrutiny and approval by bank regulators seeking to maintain 
safety and soundness.306  
Rational shareholder apathy is likely to be particularly pro-
nounced at the largest banks given their high information costs, 
coordination problems, and decision uncertainties. Accounts of 
shareholder activism in banking remain limited. Emerging evi-
dence appears to support the observation that shareholders are 
likely to remain disengaged from governance. A study examining 
all documented instances of shareholder action at banks between 
1994 and 2010 found that bank holding companies do experience 
activism and intervention by shareholders—337 banks experi-
enced actions during the sample period.307 However, not all 
banks were targeted equally. Rather, activists focused their at-
tention on smaller banks characterized by high agency costs, low 
firm value, a smaller geographical footprint, and growth poten-
tial. Activists generally sought to engage management and to 
suggest strategic changes (altering business lines, improve-
ments in operational efficiency, etc.) as well as to encourage 
banks to declare dividends.308  
 
 306. Concentration Limits (Regulation XX), 12 C.F.R. pt. 251 (2014) (limit-
ing the merging of banks that might create a single bank whose liabilities would 
be 10% or more of all U.S. liabilities). On activity restrictions, see, Omarova, 
Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 53, at 1692–95. On living wills requiring 
sharper focus and on simplifying corporate structures, see discussion supra Part 
III.A. 
 307. Raluca A. Roman, Shareholder Activism in Banking 46 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Kan. City, Research Working Paper 15-09, 2015). 
 308. Id. The research on shareholder activism is extensive. See, e.g., Alon 
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Anecdotally, instances of shareholder activism at the largest 
banks have tended to be much less frequent. A cohort of special-
ist activist hedge funds, such as Trian Fund Management (that 
targeted State Street and Bank of New York Mellon) or Green-
light (that targeted Citizens Financial Group and CIT Group), 
has taken the initiative.309 This paucity of action should not be 
surprising, given the costs and complexities of staging interven-
tions at the largest, most complex, and tightly regulated banks.  
B. WHY SHAREHOLDERS FAIL IN BANK GOVERNANCE 
Scholars have pointed to bad corporate governance as a key 
cause driving the 2008 Financial Crisis.310 Theory explains why 
shareholders and managers at banks possess incentives to push 
for short-term, risky profits. Because a small group of asset man-
agers now hold equity across major U.S. banks, theory would 
suggest that they will be especially vulnerable to the pull of these 
problem motivations.311  
Theory also suggests that bank shareholders seek out 
risk.312 As residual claimholders and the bearers of default risk, 
shareholders gain by encouraging a bank to take on risk. They 
win when it performs profitably. If risks materialize, sharehold-
ers are wiped out. Particularly as a firm edges toward a collapse, 
these distortions become sharper as shareholders and managers 
go for broke to seek out a big win.313 Incentives to push for risk 
 
Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Perfor-
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tors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1 (2013) (noting that a substantial ma-
jority of the 13D filings were not made by hedge fund activist investors). 
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become more powerful where shareholder winnings can be max-
imized through leverage. Because banks can borrow more 
cheaply relative to other firms, shareholders are well placed to 
push for greater risk-taking at the expense of a bank’s credi-
tors.314  
For shareholders at the largest banks, these motivations 
will be even more compelling. The chance that shareholders are 
wiped out will be reduced by the promise of expansive public sup-
port: (1) the Federal Reserve will step in to provide emergency 
liquidity, (2) the FDIC will guarantee a bank’s short-term de-
posit liabilities, and (3) regulators may offer a bailout to make 
sure that a really large bank does not inflict serious economic 
damage through its failure. Because of these protections, bank 
shareholders should underprice the cost of their risk seeking. 
They will be slower to discount the value of their bank equity 
investment relative to other types of firms.315 
At first sight, asset managers, invested across multiple 
firms, may be particularly susceptible to these bad incentives. 
The scale of the gains on offer are vast. Blockholders are invested 
across many of the biggest U.S. financial firms that have system-
wide access to cheap credit and the greatest likelihood of carry-
ing the “too-big-to-fail” label.316  
Also, asset managers can push bank managers by providing 
a meaningful check on their power and influence. As blockhold-
ers with an enormous reserve of available capital, these asset 
managers represent especially persuasive voices to take bank 
managers down risk-chasing pathways.317 Viewed in this way, 
even though bank governance entails high expense, the pay-offs 
could be tantalizing for asset managers. For shareholders like 
BlackRock, Vanguard, and other blockholders across the banks 
studied, the cost-benefit trade-off might seem especially lucra-
tive. Rather than seeking out changes at every single one of their 
banks, it may be possible to encourage changes across many or 
most banks by taking action at one or two large institutions. 
With the possibility of a more systemic impact across multiple 
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firms, risky activist governance may provide real bang for the 
buck.  
Conversely, returning to the asset manager as the paradig-
matic passive shareholder, rational passivity by asset managers 
can also constitute a source of riskiness in large banking institu-
tions. Passive asset managers may fail to invest in properly over-
seeing a bank. If they miss signs of risky behavior by managers 
or do not punish it in a timely way, their passiveness can breed 
negative externalities across the system.318  
Passivity by investors like Fidelity and Vanguard can be 
risky where their apathy leads them to follow more aggressive, 
activist players seeking governance changes. As Professors Gil-
son and Gordon argue, activism in corporate life tends to follow 
the lead of activist hedge funds that seek a return on their money 
by suggesting changes to a target’s governance practices.319 Ap-
athetic institutional investors can simply go along with these 
more engaged actors without having to privately expend efforts 
and capital.320 In banking, hedge fund activists can purchase a 
small stake in a bank and use this share to agitate for change—
with asset managers motivated to simply go along with a vocal 
shareholder advocate. Trian Partners, for example—an activ-
ist—worked to change the governance of State Street and Bank 
of New York Mellon, large U.S. banks that specialize in the safe-
keeping of financial assets.321 Trian purchased a 1.2% share in 
State Street in 2011 (rising to 3.3% before being sold off in 2013) 
and a 2.5% stake in BNY Mellon in 2014 (worth $1.05 billion at 
the time of purchase).322 In the case of State Street, Trian pub-
lished a forty-page list of State Street’s alleged problems and 
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pushed for management to cut operating costs and increase rev-
enue.323 For example, one of Trian’s proposals suggested that 
State Street spin off its asset management arm—State Street 
Global Advisors—to take advantage of the revenue gains.324 
While this latter proposal fell by the wayside, State Street’s 
share price did climb and Trian sold at a profit in 2013.325 
Controversy surrounds the question of whether hedge fund 
activists are a benefit or burden to corporate governance.326 It is 
not the aim of this Article to take any position on this issue. The 
point is simply that activist advances in banks can implicate con-
cerns of financial risk. For example, cost-cutting measures might 
involve shedding internal supervisory and compliance staff, in-
creasing the workload on those left behind, or hiring less quali-
fied individuals to fill the same positions. Indeed, Professor Ro-
man’s study on shareholder activism in banking pointed to its 
potential to introduce riskiness into the financial system by cre-
ating pressure on management to produce higher shareholder 
returns—at a cost to the financial system as a whole.327 
Passivity by asset managers, then, may fail to catch in-
stances of potentially damaging activism. Where the interests of 
an activist may be focused on a single firm for a determined hori-
zon of time, like that of BlackRock, Fidelity, or Vanguard, the 
effect is broader and extends across the system of banks as a 
whole. While an activist agenda may be beneficial at one bank, 
its pursuit may result in an increase of risk at others, placing 
the longer-term value of funds at risk of significant depletion. 
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C. WHY SHAREHOLDERS CAN SUCCEED IN BANK GOVERNANCE 
Asset managers can be beneficial for bank regulation. Their 
passivity, ironically, can offer a counter-point to the conventional 
view that bank shareholders are risk seeking and a danger to 
financial stability. 
As discussed in Part II, asset managers have generally 
shown themselves to be passive in corporate governance. Be-
cause they manage money for others, earn flatter compensation 
through management fees (rather than a cut of the profits), and 
try to keep these fees low for customers, a passivity posture in 
governance seems unsurprising. Bank governance, especially, 
can harden this rational apathy. Information costs are high, and 
the availability of the safety net dissuades shareholders from 
governance and monitoring. Given that asset managers are in-
vested at the biggest, most systemic of U.S. banks, both of these 
factors are likely to be especially salient. 
But seen another way, this trend towards passivity also 
means that asset managers are less likely to be risk-seeking 
bank shareholders. Asset managers do not stand to take a cut of 
the profits from such risk-taking privately. Whatever gains they 
make from governance will also accrue to competitor asset man-
agers.328 Blockholder asset managers, thus, present regulators 
with a presumptively safer shareholder than what theory might 
first suggest. Asset managers have only recently deepened the 
economic stakes within the banking sector, significantly increas-
ing block stakes from 2011 onwards. How these shareholders ac-
tually behave over time will only become clearer. But, from the 
standpoint of their business model—as well a past record of pas-
sive governance—their presence within the equity of the finan-
cial system points to a more benign shareholder with the poten-
tial, if properly harnessed, to benefit regulation and financial 
stability. Certainly, as mentioned above, passivity can be risky 
if it means a free hand to managers or riskier shareholders to 
move the banks towards reckless risk-taking. Importantly, how-
ever, the fact that asset managers are not primarily driven to-
wards aggressive outcomes offers regulators a less worrisome ac-
tor within financial markets.  
Asset managers are also better placed than other types of 
shareholders to internalize the high costs of bank oversight. Par-
ticularly for those invested across multiple large banks, the costs 
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of acquiring and analyzing information pertaining to bank bal-
ance sheets can be more efficiently borne than by other types of 
bank shareholders. Their investment in privately acquiring data 
about banks and banking can pay off by being applicable to the 
many firms where asset managers are invested. Blockholders 
like BlackRock, State Street, or Vanguard can utilize insights 
about the industry to their extensive portfolio of bank equity 
holdings.  
Indeed, by being able to cast an industry-wide eye across the 
financial market, blockholders provide a partial private fix to the 
concern that capital regulation is not well tailored to deal with 
system-wide risks. As Professor Acharya observes, capital re-
serves at individual banks may be too shallow to match the hit 
of a system-wide cascade of problems.329 Professor Scott points 
to the problem of market-wide interconnection between firms as 
an amplifying catalyst for the spread of contagion across finan-
cial markets.330 As the Crisis made clear, financial firms showed 
themselves vulnerable to correlated risk-taking (e.g., all invest-
ing in real estate referenced securities) that deepened the inten-
sity of the crash as asset values fell simultaneously across bal-
ance sheets.331 The current design of capital cushions takes some 
steps to deal with the problem of systemic risks, such as by im-
posing a special surcharge on the largest banks.332 This addi-
tional layer of capital can give the biggest firms an extra buffer 
to protect against sudden cascades of destabilizing risk and to 
also stop large risks from bleeding out from the bank into the 
financial system.  
Asset managers like BlackRock and Vanguard can offer a 
separate, more systemic lens to better analyze the risks accumu-
lating within financial markets. As blockholders across nearly 
all the major banks, they possess information and clout to act in 
case these risks accumulate. Perhaps most importantly, funds 
administered by asset managers are anchored by a fiduciary 
duty owed to savers.333 To the extent that asset managers fail in 
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monitoring banks and allow crises to emerge, they risk seeing 
fund equity being used up to ensure the safety of the financial 
system. With their funds invested across multiple banks, asset 
managers face the doomsday prospect that bank runs within the 
financial system might deplete the value of any number of funds. 
This potential risk raises a strong business case, if not perhaps 
even a legal argument, for fund managers to invest in bank over-
sight as a way of forecasting and mitigating the risk to their 
funds within the financial system.  
IV.  POLICY EXTENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS   
This Article makes the following three contributions. First, 
it shows that the twenty-six most important U.S. banks have an 
increased number of blockholders in their capital structure since 
2011. In the period following the implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Act, some of these top banks have gone from having no 
equity blockholders to multiple such shareholders on their bal-
ance sheets. A small group of asset managers have come to dom-
inate as shareholders of record in banking, representing the 
funds they administer. By becoming blockholders at the largest 
and most systemic U.S. banks, funds run by these asset manag-
ers have assumed the residual default risk of much of the finan-
cial system.  
Second, this Article examines the effectiveness of asset man-
agers as essential players in bank governance. As argued in Part 
III, the picture is mixed. As investors across multiple banks, as-
set managers face hurdles both informationally and practically 
in acquiring information about complex financial firms. It is also 
possible that these asset managers behave like a paradigmatic 
bank shareholder and use their power and presence to engage in 
widespread risk-taking. But, this Article provides a more nu-
anced account of their incentives. Importantly, asset managers 
have traditionally been passive players in governance. This may 
be beneficial for bank regulation to the extent it offsets risk seek-
ing. They are also well placed to internalize high information 
costs efficiently to help further their oversight efforts.  
In its third contribution, this Part proposes pathways to har-
ness the strengths of asset managers as bank shareholders to 
motivate a more robust bank supervisory system. This outline 
represents a first step in a longer project to analyze the implica-
tions of how risk in the financial system is allocated and who 
bears it. The end goal is anchored in concerns of political econ-
omy to determine whether those contracting to bear the risks of 
  
656 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:587 
 
the financial system, in fact, possess the institutional resilience 
to do so.  
A. A DUTY TO SUPERVISE  
Asset managers have considerable reason to exercise over-
sight of the financial system. They control funds that take on 
potentially large and also complex risks by owning block equity 
stakes at large and systemically significant banks. Banks are 
unique companies. Their core design implicates risk: short-term 
liabilities (liabilities) constitute a basis for funding longer-term 
assets (loans). If banks run into problems, a rush by depositors 
to retrieve their cash can result in banks having to liquidate 
loans and sell off their assets in panicked, fire-sale conditions. 
Because depositors may fail to distinguish between banks, a cri-
sis at one can spiral into a wider systemic collapse.334 Such mar-
ket-wide peril can have a particularly disastrous effect for asset 
managers who are invested widely in the financial system.335 As 
seen in the aftermath of the 2008 Crisis, financial failure may 
prompt savers to see their fund portfolios lose value as well as to 
cash out what they have saved with asset management firms.  
From this standpoint, asset managers have a strong incen-
tive to perform oversight of the banking system. Those who save 
with them ought to also support the exercise of such scrutiny. 
Indeed, regulators too possess real reasons to see asset manag-
ers perform more diligent oversight and governance systemati-
cally in financial markets. As argued earlier, asset managers, as 
bank shareholders, present a much more palatable proposition 
than theory’s hypothetical bank shareholder. Because of their 
historic passivity336—they do not have their own money directly 
on the line or pay managers performance-based fees—asset man-
agers, in particular, may be much less motivated to chase risks 
at the expense of financial stability. Perhaps most importantly, 
asset managers are invested system-wide, with the likes of 
BlackRock and Vanguard possessing block equity investments 
across almost all of the big twenty-six banks. This means that 
investments in information and analysis by asset managers 
should be well-spent. Further, because of their investment at 
multiple firms, asset managers should possess a systemic per-
spective when analyzing risk and exercising oversight. This can 
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help reassure regulators. Rather than simply aligning them-
selves to short-term, risk-seeking bank managers at a single 
firm, asset managers may exercise a more systemic lens to dis-
suade a bank from taking risks (e.g., correlated exposures) that 
might imperil other firms within the financial system.  
With asset managers embedded within the equity of the fi-
nancial system, it seems timely to explore whether regulation 
will benefit from requiring asset managers to have an affirma-
tive duty of diligent oversight. In other words, ought regulators 
require those asset managers holding a block (or sizable) stake 
at a bank to take on a more explicitly proactive role in monitor-
ing the bank? Such a duty would require an asset manager to 
show that she has taken steps to more carefully monitor bank 
risk-taking and its system-wide impact, as well as show the steps 
and suggestions an asset manager has forwarded to improve 
governance outcomes at the bank.  
If regulators do not wish to impose a full duty, they might 
still strongly encourage asset managers to diligently monitor 
bank risks. This softer, but still persuasive, nudge towards gov-
ernance may work to bring asset managers into bank oversight 
without the full legal and administrative costs involved in creat-
ing a duty. 
A requirement that asset managers oversee bank riskiness 
will have to adapt to the fiduciary duty they owe to fund holders 
to deliver returns. Higher transaction costs to perform govern-
ance, combined with reduced profits from a more cautious bank-
ing system, might perhaps constitute a breach by an asset man-
ager of her duty to fund holders.337  
But the requirement that asset managers do more to moni-
tor banks should not face a serious challenge on this count. For 
one, an obligation on the part of asset managers to monitor 
banks does not require that shareholders stamp out all risk-tak-
ing (and thus all opportunities for a bank to make a profit) but, 
rather to scrutinize risk-taking more diligently for its impact on 
the bank’s solvency and that of the financial system. Indeed, an 
asset manager’s disapproval may fail to change a bank’s policy if 
other shareholders fail to go along or if they disagree with the 
asset manager’s assessment of riskiness. As noted in Part III, 
firms may reasonably differ about what a safe, well-functioning 
financial institution looks like and how it should operate as a 
matter of governance. In addition, scholars have long remarked 
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that the content of a fund manager’s fiduciary standard is noto-
riously fuzzy, giving rise to considerable uncertainty regarding 
how it should be interpreted.338 This interpretative untidiness 
gives room to create a stronger mandate on asset managers to-
wards bank oversight. As scholars have recognized, the peculiar 
nature of bank capital structure has impacted how the law in-
terprets (and should interpret) traditional duties to which corpo-
rate law actors like directors are subject.339 Particularly given 
that scrutiny by asset managers should protect fund interests 
from being diminished by bank recklessness, introducing a duty 
(or recommendation) for asset managers to monitor should be le-
gally sound to challenge.  
A number of scholars have offered solutions to enhance cor-
porate governance at financial institutions. Professor Schwarcz, 
for example, has advocated for bank managers to observe a duty 
to the “public interest” in the performance of their duties.340 Pro-
fessor Omarova suggests mandating that bank boards include a 
representative of the state to advocate on behalf of the public.341 
Policy ideas such as these reflect the ongoing uneasiness of ob-
servers that (1) corporate governance and financial regulation 
are intrinsically linked and (2) that regulatory reform has not 
done enough to shore up this transmission channel for financial 
risk-taking.342  
This Article’s proposal also recognizes the connection be-
tween bank governance and financial stability. It is, however, 
shaped and motivated by the real-world emergence of asset man-
agers as key shareholders taking on their books (or rather those 
of their funds) potentially enormous bank default risk. This pro-
posal is grounded in the argument that asset managers should 
be safer bank shareholders, bringing a systemic lens to oversight 
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as well as a deeper capacity to absorb and efficiently use re-
search investments.  
A proposal such as this, however, comes with drawbacks. 
First off, it runs counter to the business model and governance 
practices of asset managers. Imposing a mandate to supervise 
banks on asset managers—who are traditionally passive, reluc-
tant to charge high fees, and unlikely to see competitive benefit 
from active governance—presents a practical challenge. For ex-
ample, if asset managers must invest in information and action, 
they will presumably pass some or all of these costs on to cus-
tomers. If savers must pay more to access long-term wealth man-
agement products, fewer might do so, depriving them of an im-
portant economic resource. 
A mandate on asset managers to exercise active governance 
can thus backfire. At a time when banks need ready access to 
equity capital, governance costs may discourage asset managers 
from investing their fund capital into the bank equity. On the 
one hand, this might seem like a desirable outcome to the extent 
that reducing investment by asset managers in banking might 
lessen the default risk falling on fund holders. On the other, how-
ever, it might also give rise to problematic outcomes. If asset 
managers pull back from the banking system, other capital pro-
viders will take their place. This might include funds that risk 
their own money, take bigger risks, and that become susceptible 
to the perverse incentives that usually afflict bank shareholders. 
Where bank shareholders end up being more risk seeking, their 
influence on the financial system may still place public savings 
at risk if the market falters or taxpayers are forced to provide a 
bailout to a failing system.  
Second, there is no guarantee that asset managers will ex-
ercise good governance. Where suggestions are poorly thought 
out, asset managers may propagate bad ideas and compound 
risks within the system as a whole. For instance, they might of-
fer similar proposals for different banks. This may be problem-
atic as large banks do differ from one another and one-size-fits-
all solutions may cause more harm than good. For example, 
Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo 
are far bigger by asset size than other banks on the Federal Re-
serve’s list. JPMorgan Chase tops this list with more than $2 
trillion in assets, with Wells Fargo and Bank of America coming 
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in next with around $1.7 trillion in assets each.343 Arguably, de-
cisions taken with respect to these banking giants may have a 
different effect on the financial system than, say, a similar pro-
posal at a smaller, but still significant bank, like PNC Bank (as-
set size, approximately, $350 billion).344 A bad set of governance 
proposals that hit the likes of JPMorgan Chase will cause heavy 
stress on the financial system. However, a bigger bank will also 
be able to access the fullest array of state resources for assis-
tance. Even without relying on state support, the biggest banks 
may perhaps be better able to withstand periodic hits, by dint of 
diversification, a deeper capital base (e.g., because of a higher G-
SIB capital surcharge), and access to international credit mar-
kets. In sum, asset managers may underestimate or misunder-
stand the fuller impact of their decision making, a foreseeable 
outcome given the information asymmetries and complexities 
that are inherent to modern banking.  
Third, policy initiatives to lower the governance costs on as-
set managers are likely to be practically unworkable. To make it 
easier and cheaper for asset managers to comply with the duty, 
policymakers might try to help them defray these costs. For ex-
ample, regulators might consider giving asset managers better 
access to information about bank performance. Richer infor-
mation should yield more accurate assessments about bank risk 
and the degree of default exposure that fund holders are assum-
ing. Because of the public interest in ensuring that the wealth of 
savers is safe, taking measures to lower the compliance costs for 
asset managers may seem like a prudent idea. But interventions 
along this line of reasoning are riddled with problems. Asset 
managers might be nudged towards activism through the offer 
of cheaper information (for example). However, by getting spe-
cial regulatory assistance, asset managers enjoy extra (maybe 
unfair) advantages relative to other types of shareholders. By 
giving privileges to asset managers over other investors, regula-
tors are putting their thumb on the scale in favoring one type of 
investment vehicle over another. Special access to information 
and assistance can also lead to the exact result regulators wish 
to avoid. With information, asset managers might consider 
banks too risky or too complex. They might sell their stake in-
stead of investing in corporate governance actions.345 Such exits 
 
 343. Statistical Release 2018, supra note 274. 
 344. Id. 
 345. However, asset manager blockholders who wish to sell their stakes do 
face economic constraints. See Patrick Jahnke, Voice Versus Exit: The Causes 
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will send a powerfully negative signal to the market, potentially 
setting off panic about a bank’s health. Conversely, cheap access 
to important information about critical institutions might 
prompt fund managers to overinvest in banking stocks, even if 
these present serious risks.  
Finally, encouraging asset managers to exercise governance 
is likely to create serious concerns from the perspective of anti-
trust policy. Already, scholars have voiced deep misgivings about 
the broad block ownership by asset managers of public compa-
nies, arguing that it leads to collusive, anticompetitive con-
duct.346 They posit that, with the same set of asset managers 
holding stakes at competitor firms, U.S. public companies are 
more likely to engage in, or at least tolerate, anticompetitive be-
havior. In the airline industry as well as in banking, they point 
to a record of higher prices and reduced choice for consumers.347 
This account remains contentious. However, its resonance will 
be amplified by financial regulatory policies seeking to encour-
age asset managers to use their block shareholder power to push 
governance outcomes at rival bank firms. This Article’s concern 
lies squarely in the field of financial regulation and is motivated 
by the objective of harnessing the strengths of asset managers to 
build market solvency and protect the interests of fund holders. 
However, it is clear that policymakers will inevitably face regu-
latory choices that stand in tension and that require authorities 
to carefully scrutinize the conduct of private actors in public 
markets.  
Importantly, creating a duty for asset managers to privately 
scrutinize the banks they invest in does not absolve public regu-
lators from strenuously supervising markets or dealing with pol-
icy questions (e.g., resolving tension between financial regula-
tion versus antitrust law). This Article’s goal is to highlight the 
key place of asset managers on the front line of financial risk 
management in markets. With extensive broad block investment 
across the major U.S. banks, asset managers can offer a systemic 
lens to bolster, rather than replace or undermine, existing public 
oversight. Within this taxonomy, public regulators remain re-
sponsible for maintaining the safety and soundness of banking 
 
and Consequence of Increasing Shareholder Concentration (Sept. 18, 2017) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with Minnesota Law Review). 
 346. See AZAR, ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 36; Azar, Anticompetitive 
Effects, supra note 36; Elhuage, supra note 36. 
 347. See supra notes 36, 76 and accompanying text. 
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markets—as well as the conduct of major asset managers as 
some of the largest shareholders within it.  
B. QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This Article constitutes the first step in a longer project ex-
amining questions about how regulation allocates default risk in 
financial markets and whether those who hold it possess the in-
stitutional resilience to do so. This work begins by identifying 
which actors are emerging as the key absorbers of default risk in 
post-Crisis financial markets. Following the Dodd-Frank Act, 
regulation is clear in requiring the largest U.S. banks to deepen 
their capital base and to ensure that they are more fully funded 
by issuing common equity. Whether because of this policy focus 
or due to some other reason (e.g., increasing inflows of capital to 
mutual funds), bank capital bases now include multiple asset 
managers as blockholders. In examining the question of who 
holds this risk, then, this Article shows that it is being assumed 
by the largest asset managers, and ultimately those savers who 
entrust them with looking after their long-term wealth. In this 
work, I examined how effectively asset managers might behave 
as block shareholders to deploy their governance power to man-
age bank solvency. 
This inquiry gives rise to deeper institutional questions 
about the capacity of asset managers (and the funds they control) 
to bear the default risk for much of the financial system. Put 
simply, what might happen to BlackRock or Vanguard—and 
their funds—if the financial system were to see a widespread run 
on the biggest U.S. banks? Are these shareholders too-big-to-
fail? If regulators decided that one or more major U.S. banks 
should be wound down and for bank equity to be wiped out in 
order to pay off creditors, what kind of losses might savers suf-
fer? How might an asset manager respond to prevent a sudden 
run on their funds in response to an imminent banking crisis—
and will such steps be effective to staunch the bleeding within 
its own firm and also the financial system? 
These questions constitute the subject of further research 
and scholarship. Its scope is not restricted to examining just the 
equity holdings of the biggest and most systemic U.S. banks. It 
extends more broadly to also analyze those securities whose pay-
outs rank low on the priority ladder, explicitly designed to be 
consumed by a wind down procedure.348 
 
 348. For example, in the United States, designated large banks must have 
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Ultimately, this line of research aims to probe the limits of 
financial regulation and political economy. Regulation might set 
the rules by which banks are designed to be wound down, placing 
the risk of their failure on a certain cohort of actors. However, 
how those laws are implemented—if, indeed they are imple-
mented at all—implicates issues of policy and political will. 
While Banco Popular might have been allowed to fail, with eq-
uity holders left to absorb the cost, other examples are less en-
couraging (such as Monte dei Paschi).349  
This example serves to highlight the significance of under-
standing more precisely and concretely the identity of those who 
ultimately support the default risk of large banks. While law 
seeks to build firewalls between too-big-to-fail firms and the real 
economy, whether these buffers hold up ultimately depends on 
who carries the burden. Understanding this interaction between 
financial regulation and politics can better reveal whether the 
laws on the books are really fit for purpose in practice.  
  CONCLUSION   
This Article explores a tension in financial markets regula-
tion: as policy emphasizes shareholder equity as necessary to 
bank safety, the suppliers of this equity comprise a small cohort 
of asset managers, investing Main Street’s savings. With wealth 
potentially exposed to the risks of large-scale financial failure, 
this Article explores the implications for bank corporate govern-
ance. It surveys how policy might harness the strengths of asset 
managers to be good stewards of their fund capital in financial 
regulation. In so doing, it sets the stage for exploring the fuller 
implications of capital regulation to more accurately determine 
how default risk is allocated in financial markets and who is 
charged with bearing it. In presenting this inquiry, this Article 
lays out a pathway to interrogate whether the laws on the books 
fit their implementation in practice, or whether policy has inad-
vertently encouraged the creation of too-big-to-fail shareholders 
in financial markets.  
 
 
an enhanced “Total Loss Absorbency Capacity” or TLAC consisting of Tier 1 
equity as well as certain other eligible debt securities that are subordinated to 
short-term debt. Enhanced Prudential Standards (Regulation YY), 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 252.160–65 (2017). This TLAC, in theory, deepens the buffer that banks pos-
sess to withstand a run. 
 349. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
